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ABSTRACT
The main subjective of this dissertation is to analyze three issues of current interest in
financial economics. Chapter 2 shows that the presence of the initial short position will give
traders an incentive to manipulate by buying less or selling more. When the initial short
position is not revealed, this distortion will mislead the firm through the performance of the
stock in the financial market. In this circumstance, the firm may mistakenly reject some
good projects due to the information asymmetry. After the revealing of the initial short
position, the information asymmetry could be eliminated, and thus improve the financial
market’s efficiency potentially. Chapter 3 studies how strategic risk among investors can
help explain both underpricing and underreaction in initial public offerings (IPOs) by using
theoretical and simulation tools. If the IPO raises more capital for the firm, the post-IPO
value of a firm will be higher. Hence an IPO subscriber faces strategic risk: the value of
subscribing depends on the aggregate subscription rate. As this risk is resolved immediately
after the IPO, the IPO itself is underpriced. Moreover, since individual investors have
limited wealth, a higher offer price raises the risk of undersubscription. Investors respond by
demanding a larger discount: the offer price appears to underreact to public news. Chapter
4 develops a theoretical model supported by empirical evidence examining the relation
between brokerage choice and market strength. Our model shows that although internal
transactions have the potential side benefits of higher commission and lower search costs to
an agent, in a strong housing market, most brokerage firms still prefer external transactions
because of the greater demand for housing. However, when the market weakens, external
demand for housing decreases, and brokerage firms become more willing to engage in internal
transactions. This occurs at the expense of lowering the selling price, which speaks to a
principal-agent incentive misalignment problem.
1
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
This dissertation consists of three essays discussing topics on financial economics. The
first essay seeks to present a case where price failed to efficiently allocate resources on the
stock market. It is commonly believed that prices play an important role in allocating scarce
resources because they convey information that improves the efficiency in the allocation of
scarce resources. Specifically, in secondary financial markets, the prices may reflect certain
information that can increase the efficiency of real investment decisions. However, some
researches pointed out that there are limitations in the allocative role of prices in financial
markets. In the first essay, we set up a model for short selling trading strategy and examine
its consequences. The results of the model indicate that this trading strategy will indeed
cause inefficiency. We show that prices may fail to efficiently allocate resources when the
potentially informed speculator has initial short position on the asset. And we suggests that
revealing the short position will help alleviate this problem, i.e., eliminating the information
asymmetry will improve the efficiency of the financial market.
The second essay attempts to explain how strategic risk can lead to IPO underpricing
and underreaction. Intuitively, shares sold in an IPO are more valuable if the firm reaps
more revenue from the IPO. But individual agents have limited wealth, so an IPO requires
the participation of multiple investors. As a result, investors in an IPO face strategic risk:
the value of the shares depends on the number of others who choose to subscribe to the
IPO, which cannot be exactly predicted ex ante. Since an agent’s reservation price is the
price at which she is just willing to subscribe to the IPO. But if, given her information
about the IPO, she is indeed just willing to subscribe, then she knows that some others are
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likely to have received slightly more negative information than her own and thus will choose
not to subscribe. Hence, her reservation price reflects a positive probability of undersub-
scription, which - if it occurs - will lower the firm’s value. Also the same mechanism yields
underreaction to public information that is observed prior to the IPO. Good news leads the
firm to raise the IPO price. As agents’ wealth is limited, the risk of undersubscription is
now greater: investors face even more strategic risk. Hence the IPO must be even more
underpriced than before the good news was received.
The third essay tries to answer the following questions on the real estate market. When
do agents prefer to engage in external versus internal transactions? How do internal trans-
actions, and in particular dual agent transactions, affect sale price? Do these brokerage
choice change depending on the strength of the housing market? Our study attempts to
examine these questions from a new perspective. Specifically, how will the preference for
brokerage type change when market strength changes. Moreover, after controlling for mar-
ket strength, what happens to home prices in internal versus external transactions. The key
findings in the third essay indicate two important results. First, a potential self-correction
mechanism for the principal-agent problem may exist within the housing market. As the
market strengthens, external buying orders become more attractive to agents. Leading
them to engage in more external transactions. Second, when the market weakens, internal
transactions increase. The increase in internal transactions further reduces market price
which drives sellers out and further reduces the strength of the market. Hence, the equilib-
rium brokerage choice creates a self-reinforcing mechanism toward generating more extreme
market conditions.
3
CHAPTER 2. SHORT AND DISTORT
It is widely studied that prices in the financial market provide information that help
the firm to improve efficiency of its investment decisions. In this paper, we incorporate an
initial short position in our model, and show that the initial short position will give traders
an incentive to manipulate by buying less or selling more. When the initial short position
is not revealed, this distortion will mislead the firm through the performance of the stock
in the financial market. In this circumstance, the firm may mistakenly reject some good
projects due to the information asymmetry. After the revealing of the initial short position,
the information asymmetry could be eliminated, and thus improve the financial market’s
efficiency potentially. So We propose policies including revealing of the short position to
help the financial market to fulfill its function.
2.1 Introduction
The activities of short-selling in capital market drew a lot of attentions by academics,
regulators, and politicians in recent years. As is pointed out by (Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang, 2008), Short seller account for more than 20% of trading volume and are generally
regarded as traders with access to value-relevant information, therefore it is widely believed
that short selling activity is an essential part of the price discovery mechanism. However,
the consequences of short-selling in capital market are controversial. Some advocates argue
that short-selling activities benefit capital market in various ways. For example, IOSCO
(International Organization of Securities Commissions) says: Short selling plays an impor-
tant role in capital markets for a variety of reasons, including more efficient price discovery,
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mitigating price bubbles, increasing market liquidity, facilitating hedging and other risk
management activities. (Andrew Baker, ”Why short selling is good for capital markets”,
Financial Times, FEBRUARY 20, 2011). But some critics claim that short-selling may lead
to market downturns and may be unethically used by traders to make profit. For example,
Elvis Picardo pointed out an unethical trade strategy called ”short and distort” in an ar-
ticle: this technique takes place when traders manipulate stock prices in a bear market by
taking short positions and then using a smear campaign to drive down the target stocks.
Figure 2.1 depicts the ”short and distort” manipulation. This is the mirror version of the
pump and dump, where crooks buy stock (take a long position) and issue false information
that causes the target stock’s price to increase (Elvis Picardo,”Ethics And The Role Of
Short Selling”, Investopedia). In this paper, we will set up a model for this trading strategy
and examine its consequences. The results of this model indicate that this trading strategy
will indeed cause inefficiency. How can we improve this inefficiency? Simply outlawing
short-selling may not be a good choice since short-selling may have some positive influences
such as increasing market liquidity. Instead, we propose that the regulator can reduce the
inefficiency by requiring large short-sellers to reveal their short positions. In practice, short
interest information is available, although the information is usually delayed. However, it
is the large speculator’s short position instead of the total short interest that will give the
firm information to eliminate the inefficiency.
From another point of view, this paper seeks to present a case where price failed to
efficiently allocate resources. As is proposed by (Hayek, 1945), prices play an important role
in allocating scarce resources because they convey information that improves the efficiency
in the allocation of scarce resources. Specifically, in secondary financial markets, the prices
may reflect certain information that can increase the efficiency of real investment decisions.
Several studies have been made regarding this topic, for example, in Khanna et al.(1994) adn
Leland (1992), firms use information inferred from stock price levels to make firm capacity
choice. In Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001), stock prices have an impact on firm cash
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flows because stakeholders such as employees, suppliers and customers condition on price
levels when deciding whether to stay with the firm or leave.
Figure 2.1: Short and Distort Manipulation
The basic argument for the allocation role of price is as follows: in the financial mar-
ket, speculators tend to trade on their own information, incorporating it into prices and
eliminating any mis-pricing. For example, if speculators have negative private information
about a stock, they will find it profitable to sell the stock. This action will push down
the price, reflecting the speculators’ information. If prices are informative, it is natural to
expect firms to use the information in prices to make decisions that may increase firm value
(such as investment). This is the feedback effect of prices.
However, some researches pointed out that there are limitations in the allocative role of
prices in financial markets. Goldstein and Guembel (2008) analyzes how the feedback effect
of prices provides an incentive for an uninformed speculator to manipulate the stock prices
by short-selling the stock. This reduces the stock prices and lead the firm to make incorrect
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investment decision, thus generating a profit on the speculator’s short position. When such
manipulation occurs, the information conveyed by prices is misleading, and this distorts
resource allocation will reduce the economic efficiency. Khanna and Sonti (2004) shows
that feedback from prices to asset value can generate herding. Assuming that a sequence
of buy orders increases firm value in the good state of the world, they show that a late
trader with an inventory of the stock will buy after receiving a negative private signal and
observing a sequence of buy orders. Following previous trades, this trader believes that the
state of the world is likely to be good and buys to increase the value of his inventory.
In this paper, we will show that prices may fail to efficiently allocate resources when
the potentially informed speculator has initial short position on the asset. And we suggests
that revealing the short position will help alleviate this problem. The basic setting of the
model is as follows. There is a firm that faces an investment opportunity with uncertain net
present value (NPV). There is a speculator who may or may not have the information about
the profitability of the investment. The profitability of the project is relevant to the optimal
investment decision but is not yet known to the firm. The speculator will optimally choose
to trade in the firm’s stock based on her information. The trading process is modeled in
a market micro-structure setting based on Kyle (1985). The information of the speculator
will then get partially reflected in the stock price. Thus the firm could take the information
conveyed by the price into consideration of its own investment decisions. In this paper,
we assume that the speculator initially has a short position which she needs to pay back,
but firm and market do not know about it. In this case, the prices in market will mislead
investment decisions and cause inefficiency. There are two main difference between this
paper and Goldstein and Guembel (2008). First, we impose a continuous short position in
this model instead of a discrete position in Goldstein and Guembel (2008). Second, unlike
GG model, we study the case in which participants other than the speculator are unaware
of the short position. This lets us study the welfare effects of requiring disclosure. And by
comparing the benefit before and after the revealing of the short position we will have a
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policy implication in the financial market.
Our main result is:
For the cases in which participants other than the speculator are unaware of the short
position, we have
1) If the speculator has no initial position, then she will sell if she is negatively informed;
will buy if she is positively informed; and will mix between selling and doing nothing if she
is uninformed.
2) If the speculator has a small initial short position, she will sell if she is negatively
informed or uninformed; and will buy if she is positively informed.
3) If the speculator has a large initial short position, then she will always sell no matter
she is negatively informed, positively informed or uninformed. This is the case that market
failure causes inefficiency in the resource allocation. The firm could not receive any infor-
mation through the financial market, and will make wrongly investment decisions (reject
the project when it is actually worth investing) if the short position is not revealed.
For the cases in which participants other than the speculator are aware of the short
position, we can see that the firm may also choose to invest when the trading quantity is
low. The market efficiency has been improved from two aspects. First, the behavior of
the positively informed speculator will be less aggressive when the initial short position is
large. This is because the positively informed speculator could not pretend to be negatively
informed without any cost. Second, from the firm’s point of view, a lower trading quantity
may not entirely represent a bad signal, it might also conducted by the needs of closing
initial short position from the positively informed speculator. Even if when the initial short
position is very large, which makes all types speculators sell for sure, the firm manager will
put her own judgment into consideration and try not to reject the project easily like before.
Thus by comparing the different cases before and after the revealing of the short position,
we suggest a policy to improve the inefficiency, which may help to justify the proposal that
large short position for some agents should be revealed in the market.
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2.2 The Model
In this section, I will introduce the basic settings and some general results
2.2.1 Basic Settings
The model has three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2} and a firm whose stock is traded in the financial
market. The firm’s manager needs to make an investment decision. In t = 0, a risk-neutral
speculator may or may not know whether the investment is profitable or not. The speculator
has an initial short position which the firm and market do not know. The short position is
measured by s which is the amount of stock she needs to pay back. Trading in the financial
market occurs in t = 1. In addition to the speculator, two other types of agents participate
in the financial market: noise trader and a risk-neutral market maker. The latter collects
the orders from the speculator and the noise trader and sets a price at which she executes
the orders out of her inventory. The information of the speculator may get reflected in the
price via the trading process. Speculator has to close her short position at the end of period
1. In t = 2, the manager makes the investment decision, which may be affected by the
stock price realizations. Finally, all uncertainty is realized and pay-offs are made. Figure
2.2 shows the time line of the short sale model.
Figure 2.2: Timeline of the Short Sale Model
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In t = 0, the speculator receives a perfectly informative private signal ω ∈ {h, l, ∅}. If
ω is h, which occurs with probability α2 , she knows that the project is profitable; if ω is l,
which also occurs with probability α2 , she knows that the project is unprofitable; and if ω is
∅, which occurs with probability 1− α, she believes that the project is either profitable or
unprofitable with equal probabilities. We will sometimes use the term positively informed
speculator to refer to the speculator when she obtains the signal h. We will analogously use
the terms negatively informed speculator and uninformed speculator.
Suppose that the firm has an investment opportunity that requires a fixed investment.
The firm’s manager acts in the interest of shareholders and chooses whether or not to invest
with the objective to maximize the expected firm value. The firm faces uncertainty over the
quality of the available investment opportunity. We denote the value of the investment if it
is profitable as V +; the value of the investment if it is unprofitable as V −. We assume that
it is worth investing if the project is profitable, but not when the project is unprofitable:
V + > 0 > V −. Besides, following Goldstein and Guembel (2008) we assume
V̄ =




(1− α) V̄ + α
2
V − < 0
The first inequality implies that the ex-ante NPV of the project is positive, this restriction
is imposed so that without further information, the manager will choose to take the invest-
ment. The second inequality implies that the probability α of informed trader is sufficiently
high so that the firm optimally rejects the project after orders that do not distinguish be-
tween the negatively informed and the uninformed speculator. This restriction is imposed
so that the information content of a sell order is strong enough to justify the cancellation
of the investment, even though it is known that the sell order could be generated by both
the negatively informed and the uninformed speculator.
The decision of the firm can be conditioned on the information it has about the under-
lying profitability of the project. The firm may learn such information from the price of
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its equity in the financial market. The original price of the stock is V0 in t = 0, we can
normalize it to be zero so that the stock price equals the value of investment.
The speculator has a short position in t = 0, which the firm and market do not know
about. In section 4, we assume that government is able to require the speculator to reveal
her position. Depending on her signal, the speculator may wish to trade in the financial
market in t = 1. In addition to the speculator and the market maker, there is a noise
trader. Denoting the order of the noise trader as D we assume that D = −1, 0, 1 with equal
probabilities; that is, the noise trader buys, sells, or does not trade with equal probabili-
ties. For now, we treat the noise traders’ orders as exogenous. Denoting the order of the
speculator as DS , DS ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. That is, speculator can sell/not trade/buy one unit of
the stock. Besides, the speculator needs to close her short position in t = 1, for simplicity,
we assume that she can close the short position by paying back money at the end of period
1. The money she needs to pay is equal to the current value of the stock. This may be
viewed as the speculator has signed a one-time swap with another agent, which requires the
speculator to pay some money to the agent in t = 1 and the amount of the money is equal
to the current value of the stock in short position.
Orders are submitted simultaneously to a market maker who sets the price and absorbs
order flows out of her inventory. The market maker sets the price equal to expected asset
value given the information contained in past and present order flows. This assumption
is justified when the market making industry is competitive. The market maker can only
observe total order flow Q = DS+D, but not its individual components. Possible order flows
are therefore Q ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}. Figure 2.3 describes all the potential trading quantity
results, there will be a price of the stock for each trading quantity. The price is a function of
total order flow: Pq = πqE [Vω |Q = q ], where Vω denotes the expected value of the project if
it is implemented and the signal is ω, and πQ denote the firm’s probability of implementing
the project when it observes the quantity Q. Assume the speculator submits market orders
before the market price being set, that is, orders are not contingent on current price. Thus,
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the speculator’s order will be contingent only on her own signal ω. Then, the market maker
will set the price conditional on the information she has about the quantities Q traded by
speculator and noise trader. The firm manager observes Q and will use it in her investment
decisions. Firm will invest if E [Vω |Q = q ] > 0, will not invest if E [Vω |Q = q ] < 0, will
mix between investing and not investing if E [Vω |Q = q ] = 0.
Figure 2.3: Potential Trading Quantities
We assume that:
(i) The speculator chooses {u (ω)} to maximize his expected final pay-off, given the
price-setting rule, the strategy of the manager, and the information she has at the time she
submits the trade;
(ii) The firm maximizes its expected value given its belief and all other strategies;
(iii) A price-setting strategy by the market maker {Pq} that allows him to break even
in expectation, given his belief and all other strategies.
2.2.2 Preliminaries
Assume that the trader starts with a short position s. Other participants may or may
not be aware of this position. Let ω ∈ {h, l,∅} denote the signal. In particular, the trader
is uninformed (ω = ∅) with probability 1 − α. The speculator knows that the project is
profitable (ω = h) with probability α/2 and that the the project is unprofitable (ω = l)




ω be the trader’s equilibrium probability of buying,
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selling, and doing nothing when the signal is ω ∈ {h, l,∅}. (Of course, pbω + psω + pnω = 1
for each signal ω.)
Claim 2.1. The following property holds.
Single Crossing Property (SCP). In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if pbl > 0, then
pb∅ = 1. And if p
b
∅ > 0, then p
b
h = 1. Likewise, if p
s
h > 0 then p
s
∅ = 1; and if p
s
∅ > 0
then psl = 1.
Proof. Let D ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be the noise trader’s (random) demand. Let Vω denote the
expected value of the project if it is implemented and the signal is ω. (Thus, Vh = V
+,
Vl = V
−, and V∅ = V .) Let πQ denote the firm’s probability of implementing the project
when it observes the quantity Q (whether or not Q occurs with positive probability in
equilibrium). Since the trader borrowed s shares of the firm’s stock, she must pay sPD+1
when her short position is settled. Hence, the trader’s payoff is as follows as a function of
the signal ω and the trader’s action (whether or not this action is ever taken in equilibrium):
• Buy 1 share: she gets U bω = VωED [πD+1]− (1 + s)ED [PD+1].
• Do nothing: she gets Unω = −sED [PD].
• Sell 1 share: she gets U sω = −VωED [πD−1]− (−1 + s)ED [PD−1].
Let DS ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be the number of shares that the speculator buys. For any two
actions a, a′ ∈ {b, s, n}, let ∆a,a
′
ω denote the trader’s relative payoff Uaω − Ua
′
ω from playing
a vs. a′ when her type is ω. The relative payoff from buying 1 share vs. doing nothing is
∆b,nω = U
b
ω − Unω = VωED [πD+1]− ED [PD+1] + s (ED [PD]− ED [PD+1]) .
The relative payoff from doing nothing vs. selling 1 share is
∆n,sω = U
n
ω − U sω = VωED [πD−1]− ED [PD−1] + s (ED [PD−1]− ED [PD]) .
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Finally, the relative payoff ∆b,sω from buying vs. selling is just the sum of the relative payoff
∆b,nω of buying vs. doing nothing, plus the relative payoff ∆
n,s
ω from doing nothing vs.
selling. For each DS in {−1, 0, 1}, ED [πD+DS ] ≥ 1/3 since the firm invests for sure if




























must be positive: pb∅ must equal one. The other parts of SCP are proved analogously.
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Proof. By contrapositive of the Single Crossing Property (SCP).
The following Lemma 2.1 provides a general strategy result of the firm and market
maker when total order flow Q = 0.
Lemma 2.1. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we will have π0=1 and P0 = V̄ , the
firm will always invest when total order flow Q = 0, and the market maker will set the price
equal to V̄ .
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. Since whatever the speculator chooses
to do, buying, selling or doing nothing, there will always be a probability of 13 that the total
order flow Q appears to be 0 due to the existence of the noise trader. So no matter what
type the speculator is, Q=0 will not deliver any information to the firm and market maker.
Notice that by assumption the ex-ante NPV of the project is positive, which means the firm
manager will choose to take the investment without further information. Thus the firm will
always invest when total order flow Q = 0, and based on the same information, the market
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maker will set the price equal to V̄ , the average of the profitable investment value and the
unprofitable investment value.
Claim 2.2. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if all types sell or no types buy, then
the firm and market maker will believe the deviator is positively informed; and if all types
buy or no types sell, then the firm and market maker will believe the deviator is negatively
informed;
Proof. First we will introduce a concept in the signaling game called Condition D1 (Sobel,
Joel. (2007)).
Condition D1: An equilibrium refinement that requires out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be
supported on types that have the most to gain from deviating from a fixed equilibrium.
Notice that according to the proof of Single Crossing Property, we have
∆b,nω ≥ 0⇔ Vω ≥
(1 + s)EDPD+1 − sEDPD
ED (πD+1)
∆n,sω ≥ 0⇔ Vω ≥






ω ≥ 0⇔ Vω ≥
(1 + s)EDPD+1 + (1− s)EDPD−1
ED (πD+1) + ED (πD−1)
So if all types sell or no types buy, then the set of responses ((Pq, πq)
2
q=−2) to a deviation
(to a higher action), which makes that deviation profitable, is larger for higher types.
Thus D1 implies that firm and market maker will believe the deviator is positively
informed.
Similarly, we have the symmetric results as follow
∆b,nω ≤ 0⇔ Vω ≤
(1 + s)EDPD+1 − sEDPD
ED (πD+1)
∆n,sω ≤ 0⇔ Vω ≤






ω ≤ 0⇔ Vω ≤
(1 + s)EDPD+1 + (1− s)EDPD−1
ED (πD+1) + ED (πD−1)
So if all types buy or no types sell, then the set of responses ((Pq, πq)
2
q=−2) to a deviation
(to a lower action), which makes that deviation profitable, is larger for lower types.
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Therefore D1 implies that firm and market maker will believe the deviator is negatively
informed.
The following several Lemmas together summarize the general strategies of the firm and
market maker under different total order flow. These strategy results are independent of
the speculator’s initial position, so they will be held no matter the initial short position is
revealed or not.
Lemma 2.2. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if pbh >
2V̄
αV +
, then E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0,
the firm will not choose to invest when total order flow Q = −1, the market maker will set
a price to equal zero, P−1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this Lemma is based on the Single Crossing Property we introduced
before. If the negatively informed speculator has a positive probability to buy, then accord-
ing to the Single Crossing Property, the uninformed and positively informed speculator will
choose to buy for sure. Since Q = −1 will only appear when the speculator choose to sell or
not trade, thus the firm and market maker will expect it to be a low type signal after this
trading result and choose not to invest. Even though there is a case when all three types
speculator choose to buy, which leaves Q = −1 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading result,
among them the negatively informed speculator would have the largest incentive to deviate.
D1 condition implies that when Q = −1 unexpected appears, firm and market maker will
believe it to be conducted by the negatively informed speculator, and again choose not to
invest.
As for the cases when the negatively informed speculator will never choose to buy, then
the trading strategy of uninformed speculator will become more crucial. If the uninformed
speculator has a positive probability to buy, then the Single Crossing Property tells us that
the positively informed speculator will choose to buy for sure, which leaves Q = −1 to be an
either low type signal or just no signal at all. Since by assumption, the firm will optimally
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reject the project after orders that do not distinguish between the negatively informed and
uninformed speculator, thus the firm manager will still not invest when Q = −1 in this
case.
So the only remained cases will be both the negatively informed and uninformed spec-
ulator never choose to buy. However, in these cases we also need the positively informed
speculator’s probability of buying to be low enough, which in other words is that the pos-
itively informed speculator’s probability of selling and doing nothing to be sufficient high,
to make the firm believe that investment is worthy when total order flow Q = −1.
In sum, the only cases for firm to invest when Q = −1, and the market maker to set
a positive price for the stock is when the positively informed speculator has a low enough
probability of buying. Thus by contrapositive, we will have the Lemma above.
Lemma 2.3. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if psh < 1−
2V̄
αV +
, then E (Vω |Q = −2) <
0, the firm will not choose to invest when total order flow Q = −2, the market maker will
set a price to equal zero, P−2 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this Lemma is similar to what we discussed in Lemma 2.2. Once
the positively informed speculator chooses not to sell, then the trading order Q = −2 can
be only brought by either the negatively informed speculator or the uninformed speculator.
This is because in order to have a Q = −2, we need both speculator and noise trader to
submit a selling order, if the speculator chooses not to sell, then even when the noise trader
sells, the total order flow will be at least Q = −1. So like we mentioned before, the firm will
not invest when the trading quantity implies it to be either a negatively informed speculator
or an uninformed speculator. And even though there would be a case when every types
speculator choose not to sell, which leaves Q = −2 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading
result, D1 implies that the firm and market maker will still treat Q = −2 as a low type
signal and reject the project.
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Next consider the cases when the positively informed speculator has a positive prob-
ability to sell, then by Single Crossing Property we have the uninformed and negatively
informed speculator will choose to sell for sure. Thus in order to convey an investment
signal when Q = −2, the probability of selling for the positively informed speculator should
not only be positive, but also surpass a certain level. In other words, the only cases for
firm to invest when Q = −2, and the market maker to set a positive price for the stock is
when the positively informed speculator has a high enough probability of selling. Again by
contrapositive, we will have the result as Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.4. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we will have π1=1 and P1 > 0, the firm
will always invest when total order flow Q = 1, and the market maker will set the price
greater than zero.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 2.4 is this. As long as the positively informed speculator
chooses not to sell, then whether the positively informed speculator decides to buy or do
nothing, there will always be a probability of 13 that the total order flow Q = 1. Since the
average of the high type and low type investment value is still greater than zero, so the high
type signal has a rather large incentive to encourage the firm to invest. That is to say, if
the firm manager sees a trading quantity result which could always be potentially derived
from the positively speculator’s strategy, then the firm will choose to invest. Notice that
Q = 0 in Lemma 2.1 is a special case that follows this property.
As for the cases when the positively informed speculator has a positive probability to
sell, again by Single Crossing Property, we can see that the uninformed speculator and
negatively informed speculator will both sell for sure, which leaves Q = 1 to be a trading
result that could only be brought by the positively informed speculator. Thus the firm will
optimally accept the project when Q = 1, and the market maker will set a positive price in
these cases. Even the positively informed speculator chooses to sell for sure, which leaves
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Q = 1 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading result, then D1 implies that firm and market
maker will believe it to be conducted by the positively informed speculator, and still choose
to invest.
In sum, once we see the total order flow Q = 1, the firm will then choose to invest in all
possible cases. Thus we have the result in Lemma 2.4.
Lemma 2.5. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we will have π2=1 and P2 > 0, the firm
will always invest when total order flow Q = 2, and the market maker will set the price
greater than zero.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this Lemma is similar to Lemma 2.4. Since Q = 2 could only
appear when both speculator and noise trader submit a buying order, if the speculator
chooses not to buy, then even when the noise trader buys, the total order flow will be
at most Q = 1. From what we discussed before, we can easily find that as long as the
firm manager believes a trading result could not be potentially brought by the negatively
informed speculator, then the firm will choose to invest. So if the negatively informed
speculator chooses not to buy, then the firm will invest when Q = 2 for sure. And if the
negatively informed speculator chooses to buy, then by Single Crossing Property, we have
the uninformed and positively informed speculator will both choose to buy for sure. Thus
in these cases, the firm will already have a strong enough confidence to invest due to the
behavior of positively informed and uninformed speculator.
In sum, Q = 2 is a must-invest signal for the firm, since the firm will choose to invest
in all possible cases for Q = 2. Thus we will have the result in Lemma 2.5.
According to all the Lemma 2.1 to Lemma 2.5, we will now have a general understanding
for the firm’s investment strategies. And if we look closely at Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3,
we can see that, as long as the firm strictly choose not to invest when Q = −1, then it will
also strictly choose not to invest when Q = −2 (not vice versa); and as long as the firm
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strictly choose to invest when Q = −2, then it will strictly choose to invest when Q = −1
(not vice versa). Here the ”strictly” means the firm will not mix in that case, instead it
will always choose a pure strategy. Combine with the Lemma 2.1, 2.4 and 2.5, we can see
there would be a positive relationship between the trading quantity and what profitability
the firm believes it will be. In other words, a larger quantity of total demand order will give
the firm manager a higher signal of the profitability of the project., and thus if a specific
trading quantity leads the firm to invest, then any number of trading quantity beyond will
also lead the firm to invest. This result is rather intuitive in real market. A higher quantity
of total order demand reflects that the market believes the firm will have a good prospect
in the future, and pushes the stock price up consequently.
Now that we have analyzed the strategies of the firm, next we will focus on the spec-
ulator’s side. We will first solve for the equilibrium when the initial short position is not
revealed, and then compare it with the cases when the initial short position is revealed.
2.3 Benchmark Results When Initial Short Position of Speculator is
Not Revealed
Here we consider the benchmark model: the case when the initial short position of
speculator is not revealed. In this case, the firm and market maker have no information
on the initial position of the speculator. So they will expect in an unbiased way that the
speculator initially has zero position on the stock.
2.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis From the Firm’s Point of View
Since in the firm and market maker’s belief, the speculator has no initial position on the
stock, so we will first begin with the discussion of the speculator’s strategy for s = 0.
Claim 2.3. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the initial short position s = 0, we
will have ∆b,nh > 0 and ∆
n,s




Since there is no initial short position, then the positively informed speculator’s payoff
in this game will be just her trading profit. So if the positively informed speculator chooses
to do nothing, she will get zero profit. As we discussed in previous section, the strategy of
the positively informed speculator plays an important role on firm’s investment decision,
specifically speaking, if the positively informed speculator chooses to buy, then the firm will
invest for Q = 0, 1, 2; if the positively informed speculator chooses to sell, then the firm will
invest for Q = −2,−1, 0. However, selling will always gain non-positive trading profit for
the positively informed speculator. This is because after the firm taking the investment,
the project’s value will then be realized to equal V + due to the high profitability. Since
the market maker will never set a price higher than V +, the positively informed speculator
could not earn any positive profit from selling. Besides, since the price P0 = V̄ is strictly
less than V +, thus the positively informed speculator will actually suffer a loss when Q = 0.
Therefore the expected payoff of selling for positively informed speculator will be strictly
less than zero. Apply the same logic, we can see that the expected payoff of buying for
positively informed speculator will be strictly higher than zero. Hence, in sum, the positively
informed speculator will always choose to buy when there is no initial short position.
Claim 2.4. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the initial short position s = 0, we
will have ∆b,nl < 0 and ∆
n,s
l < 0, the negatively informed speculator will always choose to
sell.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this Claim is similar to the logic of Claim 2.3. The negatively
informed speculator knows that the profitability is low type for sure. So from her point of
view, buying will always give her a negative trading profit. The reason is as follow. Since
the firm will always choose to invest when Q = 0, 1, 2 (from Lemma 2.1, 2.4, 2.5), then after
the investment taking place, the project’s value will be realized to equal V −. Notice that
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the market maker will never set a price below zero (this is because if the market maker sets a
negative price, then the firm can always choose to reject the project to prevent the expected
loss, which leaves a lower bound zero for the price), so the negatively informed speculator will
always earn a negative profit from buying. Likewise, selling will always give the negatively
informed speculator a non-negative trading profit. The reason why I use ”non-negative”
instead of ”positive” is because, unlike the cases from buying, the firm may choose not to
invest when the firm sees a lower total order flow, which then leaves a zero profit for the
negatively informed speculator. However, since Q = 0 is also a potential trading result when
the negatively informed speculator chooses to sell, then Lemma 1 ensures a positive profit
for the negatively informed speculator in that case. So the expected payoff from selling will
be strictly positive. Therefore, without any initial short position, the negatively informed
speculator will choose to sell.
Claim 2.5. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the initial short position s = 0, we
will have ∆b,n∅ < 0 and ∆
n,s
∅ = 0, the uninformed speculator will mix between doing nothing
and selling.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this Claim is based on the result in Claim 2.3 and 2.4. Now that
the positively informed speculator chooses to buy, and the negatively informed speculator
chooses to sell, then what the uninformed speculator chooses to do will make no difference in
the firm’s investment strategy. The firm will always invest when Q = 0, 1, 2 and not invest
when Q = −1,−2. If that is the case, then the uninformed speculator will earn a negative
profit from buying. The reason is the prices for Q = 1, 2 are too high. Since negatively
informed speculator will always choose to sell, then when Q = 1, 2, the firm and market
maker will treat it as either positively informed or uninformed. So the price P1 and P2 will
be both greater than V̄ . However, the expected value will be only V̄ from the uninformed
speculator’s assessment, thus she will suffer a loss if she chooses to buy and the resulting
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quantity appears to be 1 or 2. Even when Q = 0, the price equals V̄ by Lemma 2.1, the
uninformed speculator could not earn a positive profit from buying (she will actually earn
a zero profit), so in any cases with s = 0, the uninformed speculator will never choose to
buy.
If the uninformed speculator instead chooses to sell, then her payoff will be zero. This
would be much easier to understand. Since the firm will not invest when Q = −1,−2,
thus the price P−1 and P−2 will be zero, the uninformed speculator earns zero profit in
those cases. As for the cases when Q = 0, the price P0 = V̄ matches the valuation of
the uninformed speculator herself, which also makes selling unprofitable to the uninformed
speculator. In sum, the uninformed speculator will earn zero expected payoff from selling,
which is just the same as doing nothing (notice that the agents in this model are risk
neutral), so the uninformed speculator will mix between selling and doing nothing.
As we mentioned before, when the initial short position of speculator is not revealed,
firm and market maker will assume the speculator initially has no position on the stock.
So without any further information, the firm and market maker’s decisions will base on the
result in Claim 2.3-2.5. Thus according to the Lemmas in previous section, we will draw
the following Claim naturally.
Claim 2.6. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when initial short position is not revealed,
the following holds
Investment strategy: Firm will invest only when total order flow Q = 0, 1, 2, and will
not invest when Q = −1,−2.
Pricing strategy: Market maker will set price as














The firm’s investment strategy is rather intuitive. In firm’s belief, the financial markets
will provide information that guides its real investment decisions. So a higher total order
flow, Q = 1, 2, conveys a high type signal, which then gives the firm confidence to invest.
Meanwhile a lower total order flow, Q = −1,−2, delivers a low type signal, which will
suggest the firm to reject the project. And for the remained cases with Q = 0, even if it
contains no information, since the ex-ante NPV of the project is positive, the firm will still
choose to invest when Q = 0 appears.
The logic behind the pricing strategy of the market maker is basically the same. From
Claim 2.3-2.5, the only buyer would be the positively informed speculator, thus the price
P2 should be V
+. Since the firm will reject the investment when Q = −1,−2, then the
price P−1 and P−2 should be set to equal zero. And by Lemma 2.1, the price P0 is always
equal V̄ , so the only remained is the price when Q = 1. Notice that according to Claim 2.5,
the uninformed speculator is mixing between selling and doing nothing. As the uninformed
speculator’s probability of buying increases, the trading quantity Q = 1 will become less
informative, which will then squeeze down the price. On the contrary, as the uninformed
speculator’s probability of buying decreases, it will be more easily for the firm to distinguish
between the positively informed speculator and the uninformed one, which thus pushes the
price up. After some mathematical derivation, we will have the resulting summary above.
By now, we solved for the equilibrium strategies for the firm and market maker, next
we will start with the analysis from the speculator’s side.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis From the Speculator’s Point of View
Since the initial short position is not revealed, then there will be some information
asymmetry between the speculator and the firm. Obviously, the speculator will have a
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better understanding for her own situation, and thus will take advantage of what the firm
and market maker believe to maximize her own utility.
Claim 2.7. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when the initial short position s > 0 and
is not revealed, we will have ∆b,nl < 0 and ∆
n,s
l < 0, the negatively informed speculator will
always choose to sell.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this Claim is straightforward. If the initial short position s is
greater than zero, then the speculator will need to pay back money at the end of period 1 to
close her short position. So the speculator now has an incentive to lower down the stock price
in order to gain from her initial short position. As for the negatively informed speculator,
from Claim 2.4, since she already prefers to sell when s = 0, thus the introduction of the
short position will even give her a stronger motivation to sell. Moreover, the negatively
informed speculator knows that the firm will not invest when Q = −1,−2 and the market
maker will set both price to equal zero. So if the negatively informed speculator chooses to
sell, she will earn both the highest trading profit (from selling) and the highest pay-back
profit (from closing her short position). Therefore the negatively informed speculator will
still choose to sell when s > 0 and is not revealed.
Claim 2.8. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when the initial short position s > 0 and
is not revealed, we will have ∆b,n∅ < 0 and ∆
n,s
∅ < 0, the uninformed speculator will always
choose to sell.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is the same as before. The initial short position will
encourage the uninformed speculator to attack the stock price by selling. So even the
uninformed speculator is indifference between selling and doing nothing as we mentioned
in Claim 2.5, an increase in her short position s will make selling more attractive. This
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is because although the uninformed speculator could only earn a zero trading profit from
selling, which is the same as doing nothing, she can lower down the stock price through
that way, and thus earn a higher pay-back profit. So when the initial short position s > 0
is not revealed, the uninformed speculator will choose to sell.
Claim 2.9. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when the initial short position s > 0 and
is not revealed, for the positively informed speculator, the following holds
Trading strategy: If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then the positively informed speculator will always choose
to buy; if s > 1 − V̄
V +
, then the positively informed speculator will always choose to
sell.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this trading strategies is rather clear. The positively informed
speculator has a buying incentive due to her high type signal. The stock price would be
lower than the positively informed speculator’s assessment, which will give her a positive
trading profit from buying. However, the initial short position will have an opposite effect
on the positively informed speculator’s decision, i.e. the burden of closing the short position
will lead her into selling. And as the short position goes up, the pressure from the selling
side will continually become stronger. So when the initial short position s goes beyond
some threshold (it would be 1 − V̄
V +
in this case), the positively informed speculator will
eventually deviate to selling. If the short position happens to be equal 1 − V̄
V +
, then the
positively informed speculator will actually mix between buying, selling and doing nothing.
But with prices and initial short position all given constant, it seems to be non-generic in
this case, so we omit it in the Claim 2.9.
As we can see, the financial market will lose some efficiency if the short position is
not revealed, especially when the short position is relatively large. The trading result will
become more misleading as the speculator’s initial short position goes up. Since with a
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large initial short position, even the positively informed speculator will choose to sell, thus
the firm may mistakenly reject some projects which are potentially worth investing.
So in the next section, we will discuss the equilibrium when the initial short position is
revealed, and then compare these two results in detail.
2.4 Results When Initial Short Position of Speculator is Revealed
We have already shown in the last section that when the initial short position of spec-
ulator is not revealed, the allocation results induced by prices is not efficient. Here we will
examine what will happen if government requires speculator to reveal her short position s.
Claim 2.10. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when the initial short position s > 0 is
revealed, we will have ∆b,nl < 0 and ∆
n,s
l < 0, the negatively informed speculator will always
choose to sell.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Claim 2.10 is as flow. Since the initial short position is now re-
vealed, the speculator needs to reconsider the firm and the market maker’s strategies. The
difference is that now the firm may choose to invest even when Q = −1,−2. However, even
if the firm chooses to invest for Q equals either −1 or −2 (this could happen when the posi-
tively informed speculator has a high enough probability of selling), the negatively informed
speculator’s trading profit from selling will rather increase. Notice that the investment of
the firm will actually push the stock price up, and since the negatively informed speculator
knows the profitability would be low type for sure, so a positive price P−1 or P−2 will ensure
the trading profit of selling to be greater than zero. As doing nothing yields zero trading
profit, and buying will in the contrary always earn a negative trading profit, thus in this
respect, the negatively informed speculator has an incentive to sell. Also if the firm chooses
not to invest for Q = −1,−2, then the firm’s strategy would be the same as in the last
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section (Lemma 2.1, 2.4, 2.5 tell us the firm will always invest when Q = 0, 1, 2), so from
the Claim 2.7 we will have selling is still optimal for the negatively informed speculator.
Next consider the negatively informed speculator’s strategies from paying-back side.
Since the speculator needs to close her initial short position at the end of period 1, so a
lower price would be better for her to save the pay-back money. If the positively informed
speculator has a positive probability to sell, then according to the Single Crossing Property,
the uninformed and negatively informed speculator will sell for sure. Since the positively
informed speculator is the only type who will choose to buy, the price P1 and P2 will be
set to equal V +. Even when the positively informed speculator also sells for sure, which
leaves Q = 1, 2 to be out-of-equilibrium trading results, D1 implies that the firm and market
maker will believe it to be conducted by the positively informed speculator, and the price
should be still equal V +. So if the positively informed speculator has a positive probability
to sell, the price will be strictly lower when Q = −1,−2, therefore the initial short position
will encourage the negatively informed speculator to sell.
If the positively informed speculator never chooses to sell, then when Q = −2, the firm
will expect it to be either uninformed or negatively informed, and thus reject the project.
The market maker will then set price P−2 to equal zero. Since the initial short position
inspire the negatively informed speculator to squeeze down the stock price, then selling
would be optimal to close her short position in this case.
In sum, the negatively informed speculator has incentives to sell from both trading profit
side and paying-back money side. Thus when the initial short position s > 0 is revealed,
the negatively informed speculator will always choose to sell.
Claim 2.11. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when the initial short position s > 0 is
revealed, we will have ∆b,n∅ < 0, the uninformed speculator will never choose to buy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Claim 2.12. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when the initial short position s > 0 is
revealed, we will have ps∅ = 1, the uninformed speculator will always choose to sell.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The reason why I divided the strategies of the uninformed speculator into two Claims
is that the result in Claim 2.12 is actually based on what we proved in Claim 2.11. The
intuition for the uninformed speculator not to buy is straightforward. Since we already
proved in the last section that buying is a strongly dominated strategy when s = 0, thus an
introduction of the initial short position will even further make the uninformed speculator
not to buy.
The reason why the uninformed speculator will switch from mixing to selling is a little
bit tricky. Since the negatively informed speculator will always choose to sell, the price for
Q = −1,−2 will not go beyond the uninformed speculator’s valuation (which is V̄ ). So
from the trading profit side, doing nothing is always at least as good as selling. However,
compare selling with doing nothing from the paying-back money side, the price P1 will be
strictly larger than the price P−2 (the firm will expect it to be either positively informed or
uninformed when Q = 1), which makes selling more attractive to the uninformed speculator.
Thus there would be trade-off between these to strategies. But notice that the uninformed
speculator will not have more information than what the firm and the market maker know,
so the profit she can gain from trading is to some extent limited. Thus the pressure from the
paying-back money side would be stronger, which finally leads the uninformed speculator
to sell. A more rigorous mathematical proof is included in the Appendix.
Now that we have already figured out what the negatively informed speculator and the
uninformed speculator will choose to do when the initial short position s > 0 is revealed,
next we will discuss the strategies of the positively informed speculator. As for the positively
informed speculator, the trade-off effect we mentioned above will be even more complex.
So we need to solve for all possible cases in order to analysis the behavior of the positively
informed speculator.
Claim 2.13. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when the initial short position s > 0 is
revealed, the following holds for the positively informed speculator.
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Trading strategy.
• If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then pbh = 1, the positively informed speculator will always choose
to buy.
• If 1− V̄
V +
< s ≤ 1, then pbh + pnh = 1, the positively informed speculator will mix
between buying and doing nothing.
• If 1 < s < 2 − 2V̄
V +
, then pnh = 1, the positively informed speculator will always
choose not to trade.
• If 2− 2V̄
V +
≤ s ≤ 3, then pnh + psh = 1, the positively informed speculator will mix
between doing nothing and selling.
• If 3 < s, then psh = 1, the positively informed speculator will always choose to
sell.
Proof. See Appendix.
This Claim is a summary of the positively informed speculator’s strategies in all different
cases. Since the initial short position is now revealed, the positively informed speculator
could not pretend to be a negatively informed speculator without any cost. The firm and
the market maker have already realized that even the positively informed speculator will
have an incentive to sell when the initial short position is large enough. So the positively
informed speculator must take the trade-off between the trading profit loss and the paying-
back money gain into consideration.
The general idea between the Claim 2.13 is that as s goes up, the positively informed
speculator will put more weight on the gain of closing her short position, and thus gradually
move from a higher action (buying) towards a lower action (selling). To be more specific,
starting with a low volume of short position, the positively informed speculator will still
choose to buy. After the short position s goes beyond 1 − V̄
V +
, the positively informed
speculator will begin to mix between buying and doing nothing. If the short position s
increases further above 1, then doing nothing will be optimal for the positively informed
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speculator. And once the short position s reaches 2− 2V̄
V +
, the positively informed speculator
will start to mix between selling and doing nothing. Until finally when the short position s
becomes larger than 3, the positively informed speculator will always choose to sell (notice
all types speculators will sell at this time).
After solving for all the strategies of the different types speculator, we could then turn
our attention to the firm and market maker’s strategies. Since the Lemma 2.1-2.5 gives us
a general guidance of what the firm and market maker will do, so next we only need to
apply these Lemmas to draw some conclusions.
Claim 2.14. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when the initial short position s > 0 is
revealed, the following holds for the firm and the market maker.
Investment strategy.
• If s < 1 − V̄
V +
, then firm will invest when Q = 0, 1, 2, and will not invest when
Q = −1,−2.
• If 1− V̄
V +
< s < 2− 2V̄
V +
, then firm will invest when Q = −1, 0, 1, 2, and will not
invest when Q = −2.
• If 2 − 2V̄
V +
≤ s, then firm will always choose to invest, i.e. invest when Q =
−2,−1, 0, 1, 2.
Pricing strategy.
• If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then market maker will set the prices as
P1 = P2 = V
+
P0 = V̄
P−1 = P−2 = 0
• If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then market maker will set the prices as
















• If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then market maker will set the prices as
P1 = P2 = V
+
P0 = P−1 = V̄
P−2 =
[













The intuition behind this conclusion is straightforward. Since now the firm knows that
both the negatively informed and the uninformed speculators will choose to sell, the firm
manager will pay her attention only on the positively informed speculator’s behavior.
When the short position s is small, the financial market could still thought to be efficient.
The firm will follow the guidance of the total order flow, choose to invest when Q = 0, 1, 2
and reject the project when Q = −1,−2.
If the short position S becomes large enough to make the positively informed speculator
mix between buying and doing nothing. then the firm might also put Q = −1 into invest-
ment grade. According to Lemma 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, the firm will always invest when Q = 0, 1, 2,
so the firm will only reject the project when Q = −2.
Finally if the short position becomes so large that even the positively informed speculator
will always choose to sell, then the firm will invest for all possible quantities. This is
because the financial market conveys no information at this stage, the firm manager will
make decision based only on her own judgment (which always leads to an investing due to
the positive ex-ante NPV).
The intuition behind the market maker’s pricing strategies is almost the same as the
firm. The market maker will always set the price to equal zero if the firm chooses not to
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invest. And since the positively informed speculator is the only type who will choose to buy,
so the market maker will set price P1=P2=V
+. Also from the Lemma 1, we have P0=V̄ .
For the rest undetermined price, the market maker will set it to equal the expected value
of Vω. All summary results are presented in the Claim above.
After the reveal of the short position, comparing with the results in the last section, we
can see the situation has been truly improved. The firm now will not reject the projects
just because a potentially manipulated low price. Even when the initial short position goes
beyond some extremely high level, which prevent the firm from receiving any information
from the financial market, the firm would still rely on its own ex-ante judgment to make
the investment decisions. Figure 2.4 contains detailed comparison of the results when s is
revealed and not revealed.




It is commonly believed that financial markets provide information that guides real
investment decisions. However, in this paper we show that the presence of the initial
short position may cause the price to fail in fulfilling this function. By comparing the
two equilibrium results before and after the reveal of the short position, we provide some
regulation advices in the financial market.
Specifically, we study the behavior of a speculator with an initial short position, who
may or may not be informed about the profitability of the project. When the initial short
position is not revealed, the negatively informed speculator and the uninformed speculator
will choose to sell, the positively informed speculator may also choose to sell if the short
position is relatively large. This is because the introduction of the initial short position will
give the speculator an incentive to manipulate the financial market. In other words, the
uninformed speculator and the positively informed speculator may pretend to be negatively
informed. Through this way, she can squeezed down the stock price and thus reduce the
money she needs to pay back for closing her short position at the end of period 1. However,
since the firm has no idea about the initial position of the speculator, this information
asymmetry will cause the pricing mechanism to be less efficient. The firm expects the
positively informed speculator to buy and the negatively informed speculator to sell, which
then let the total order flow convey a signal about the profitability of the project. Now that
the initial position is not revealed, the trading quantity will become misleading to the firm
manager, prevent her from making the right investment decisions. In other words, when
the initial short position s is large enough, all three types speculators will choose to sell,
thus the total order flow Q could only be either −2, −1, or 0. Notice that the firm will
not choose to invest when Q = −1,−2, so the firm may reject some projects which are
essentially worth investing.
After the reveal of the initial short position, we can see that the information asymmetry
has been eliminated, so the firm may also choose to invest when the trading quantity is
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low. The market efficiency has been improved from two aspects. First, the behavior of
the positively informed speculator will be less aggressive when the initial short position is
large. Since the positively informed speculator could not pretend to be negatively informed
without any cost, so the trade-off effect between trading profit and paying-back money will
make the positively informed speculator move slower and more smooth from a higher action
(buying) towards a lower action (selling). Second, once the initial short position is revealed,
the firm can make better use of the financial market’s information. A lower trading quantity
may not entirely represent a bad signal, it might also conducted by the needs of closing
initial short position from the positively informed speculator. Even if when the initial short
position is very large, which makes all types speculators sell for sure, the firm manager will
put her own judgment into consideration and try not to reject the project easily like before.
In sum, the main result of this paper is that the short position in the financial market
should be revealed publicly. Eliminating the information asymmetry will help improve the
efficiency of the financial market. Also notice that when the short position is extremely large,
the efficiency of the financial market will be restricted even with the revealing regulation.
So further research is needed to answer the question of whether the maximum amount of
the short position for a single trader should be limited or not.
2.6 Appendix: Proofs of the Lemmas and Claims
Let
µqω = Pr (ω |Q = q ) =
Pr (Q = q |ω ) Pr (ω)
Pr (Q = q)
denote the probability of the signal given the total order flow.




2 if ω ∈ {h, l}
1− α if ω = ∅
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And the speculator’s strategy will be listed as
Pr (DS = 1 |ω ) = pbω
Pr (DS = 0 |ω ) = pnω
Pr (DS = −1 |ω ) = psω
Thus we will have a summary table of the speculator’s strategy probability given the
signal and the total order flow in Table A2.6.1.
Table A2.6.1: Probability of the Speculator’s Strategy Given Signal and Total Order Flow
Total order flow Sell Not trade Buy
−2 psω 0 0






1 0 pbω p
n
ω
2 0 0 pbω
Since Pr (Q = q |ω ) is computed as




Pr (DS = q − d |ω )
then we will also have a table of probability of the total order flow given signal in Table
A2.6.2
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. When Q = 0, the expected value of Vω is











V − + (1− α) V̄
]
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Table A2.6.2: Probability of the Realized Total Order Flow Given Different Signal


































































Since the probability of Q = 0 can be computed as



































Then we will have






V − + (1− α) V̄=V̄ > 0
Thus the firm will invest for sure when total order flow Q = 0, and the market maker
will set the price equal to expected asset value, which is E (Vω |Q = 0) =V̄
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. Since E (Vω |Q = q ) = µql V
−+µqhV
+ +µq∅V̄ , then from the table above we will have
E (Vω |Q = −1) = µ−1h V
+ + µ−1l V





























The probability of Q = −1 will be

















































So the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 will be







































= V − < 0




h = 1. In this case all three types
speculators will choose to buy, which leaves Q = −1 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading
result. Then D1 implies that the deviator is negatively informed, thus the expected value
of Vω will be E (Vω |Q = −1) = V − < 0.
Case 3. If pbl = 0 and p
b
∅ > 0, then by SCP we will have p
b
h = 1.
So the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 will be


























Pr (Q = −1)
[α
2







Pr (Q = −1)
[α
2
V − + (1− α) V̄
]
Since Pr (Q = −1) > 0, and by assumption α2V
− + (1− α) V̄ < 0, then we will have
E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0.
Case 4. If pbl = 0 and p
b
∅ = 0, then the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 will be




































V − + (1− α) V̄
]















In sum, in the first three cases, we all have E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0. And in the case 4, if
we let E (Vω |Q = −1) ≥ 0, then we will have pbh ≤
2V̄
αV +
. Thus the expected value of Vω
given Q = −1 is greater than or equal to zero will imply that the probability of buying for
positively informed speculator is less than or equal to 2V̄
αV +
. That is
E (Vω |Q = −1) ≥ 0⇒ pbh ≤
2V̄
αV +




⇒ E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0
If E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0, then firm will not invest, thus the market maker will set a price
to equal zero. So we have
E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0⇒ P−1 = 0
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. Since E (Vω |Q = q ) = µql V
−+µqhV
+ +µq∅V̄ , then from the table above we will have
E (Vω |Q = −2) = µ−2h V
+ + µ−2l V











V −psl + (1− α) V̄ ps∅
]





The expected value of Vω given Q = −2 will be






















V − + (1− α) V̄
]






V − + (1− α) V̄ ≥ 0
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⇒ pSh ≥ 1−
2V̄
αV +
Case 2. If psh = 0 and p
s
∅ > 0, then by SCP we will have p
s
l = 1.
So the expected value of Vω given Q = −2 will be
















Pr (Q = −2)
[α
2





Pr (Q = −2)
[α
2
V − + (1− α) V̄
]
Since Pr (Q = −2) > 0, and by assumption α2V
− + (1− α) V̄ < 0, then we will have
E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0.
Case 3. If psh = 0, p
s
∅ = 0, and p
s
l > 0, then the probability of Q = −2 will be
Pr (Q = −2) = 1
3
[















So the expected value of Vω given Q = −2 will be



























= V − < 0
Case 4. If psh = 0, p
s
∅ = 0, and p
s
l = 0 then in this case all three types speculators will
choose not to sell, which leaves Q = −2 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading result. Then
D1 implies that the deviator is negatively informed, thus the expected value of Vω will be
E (Vω |Q = −2) = V − < 0.
In sum, in the case 2, 3, and 4 we all have E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0. And in the case 1, if
we let E (Vω |Q = −2) ≥ 0, then we will have psh ≥ 1−
2V̄
αV +
. Thus the expected value of Vω
given Q = −2 is greater than or equal to zero will imply that the probability of selling for
positively informed speculator is greater than or equal to 1− 2V̄
αV +
. That is








⇒ E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0
If E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0, then firm will not invest, thus the market maker will still set a
price to equal zero. So we have
E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0⇒ P−2 = 0
Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof. When Q = 1, the expected value of Vω is



















Case 1. If psh = 0, then we will have




Pr (Q = 1)
[α
2






















3 Pr (Q = 1)
> 0





















l = 1. In this case all three types
speculators will choose to sell, which leaves Q = 1 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading result.
Then D1 implies that the deviator is positively informed, thus the expected value of Vω will
be E (Vω |Q = 1) = V + > 0.
In sum, E (Vω |Q = 1) will be greater than zero in all three cases, so the firm will always
invest when Q = 1 and the market maker will then set the price P1 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.5
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Proof. When Q = 2, the expected value of Vω is










V + + pbl
α
2
V − + pb∅ (1− α) V̄
]









Pr (Q = 2)
[α
2
V + + pbl
α
2















3 Pr (Q = 2)
> 0




h > 0, then









V + + pb∅ (1− α) V̄
]
> 0
Case 3. If pbl = 0, p
b
h = 0, and p
b
∅ = 0, then in this case all three types speculators
will not choose to buy, which leaves Q = 2 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading result. Then
D1 implies that the deviator is positively informed, thus the expected value of Vω will be
E (Vω |Q = 2) = V + > 0.
In sum, E (Vω |Q = 2) will be greater than zero in all three cases, so the firm will always
invest when Q = 2 and the market maker will then set the price P2 > 0.
Proof of Claim 2.3
Proof. If the initial short position s = 0, then the positively informed speculator’s payoff






















Notice that the market maker will set the price equal to expected asset value, so the
price given total order flow Q = q will be
Pq = πqE (Vω |Q = q )






πd+1 (Vh − E (Vω |Q = d+ 1))
Since E (Vω |Q = d+ 1) ≤ Vh for all d, and when d = −1, from Lemma 2.1 we have
E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄ < Vh
⇒ ∆b,nh > 0
Also the relative payoff from doing nothing vs. selling is
∆n,sh = U
n






















πd−1 (Vh − E (Vω |Q = d− 1))
Since E (Vω |Q = d− 1) ≤ Vh for all d, and when d = 1, from Lemma 2.1 we have
E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄ < Vh
⇒ ∆n,sh > 0
In sum, both ∆b,nh and ∆
n,s







is also greater than zero, so the positively informed speculator will always choose to buy.
Proof of Claim 2.4
Proof. If the initial short position s = 0, then the negatively informed speculator’s payoff



























πd+1 (Vl − E (Vω |Q = d+ 1))
Since E (Vω |Q = d+ 1) ≥ Vl for all d, and when d = −1, from Lemma 2.1 we have
E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄ > Vl
⇒ ∆b,nl < 0
The relative payoff from doing nothing vs. selling is
∆n,sl = U
n






















πd−1 (Vl − E (Vω |Q = d− 1))
Since E (Vω |Q = d− 1) ≥ Vl for all d for all d, and when d = 1, from Lemma 2.1 we
have E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄ > Vl
⇒ ∆n,sl < 0
In sum, both ∆b,nl and ∆
n,s







also less than zero, so the negatively informed speculator will always choose to sell.
Proof of Claim 2.5
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Proof. If the initial short position s = 0, then the uninformed speculator’s payoff of doing































V̄ − E (Vω |Q = d+ 1)
)
From Claim 2.3 and Claim 2.4 we have pbh = 1 and p
s
l = 1, so the probability of Q = 1
will be






































Thus the expected value of Vω given Q = 1 is




Pr (Q = 1)
[α
2
V + (1− psh) +
α
2








Pr (Q = 1)
[α
2








































= V̄ > 0
⇒ π1 = 1
Similarly, the probability of Q = 2 will be





















So the expected value of Vω given Q = 2 is
















Pr (Q = 2)
[α
2




























V̄ + (1− α) V̄ pb∅
]
= V̄ > 0
⇒ π2 = 1
Finally, from Lemma 2.1 we have E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄ and π0 = 1, thus to sum up
E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄
E (Vω |Q = 1) > V̄
E (Vω |Q = 2) > V̄
π0 = π1 = π2 = 1
⇒ ∆b,n∅ < 0































V̄ − E (Vω |Q = d− 1)
)
From Claim 2.3 we have pbh = 1 , thus p
s
h = 0. According to Lemma 2.2, since p
b
h = 1 >
2V̄
αV +
, then E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0, firm will not invest when Q = −1, i.e. π−1 = 0. According
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to Lemma 2.3, since psh = 0 < 1−
2V̄
αV +
, then E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0, firm will not invest when
Q = −2, i.e. π−2 = 0. Finally from Lemma 2.1 we have E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄ , thus
⇒ ∆n,s∅ = 0
In sum, we have ∆b,n∅ < 0 and ∆
n,s






∅ < 0. So
the uninformed speculator will never choose to buy, he will mix between doing nothing and
selling.
Proof of Claim 2.6
Proof. When the initial short position of speculator is not revealed, firm and market maker
will assume the speculator initially has no position on the stock, which is s = 0. From
Claim 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 we have, positively informed speculator will always buy; negatively
informed speculator will always sell; uninformed speculator will mix between doing nothing
and selling. That is















According to Lemma 2.2, since pbh = 1 >
2V̄
αV +
, then E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0, firm will not
invest when Q = −1, and P−1 = 0.
According to Lemma 2.3, since psh = 0 < 1 −
2V̄
αV +
, then E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0, firm will
not invest when Q = −2, and P−2 = 0.
According to Lemma 2.1 we have E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄ , firm will invest when Q = 0, and
P0 = V̄ . Next consider the cases when Q = 1, 2.
The probability of Q = 2 will be



















Then the expected value of Vω given Q = 2 is


































= V + > 0
So the firm will invest when Q = 2, and the market maker will set price to equal V +
Similarly, the probability of Q = 1 will be


































Thus the expected value of Vω given Q = 1 will be




Pr (Q = 1)
[α
2
V + (1− psh) +
α
2








Pr (Q = 1)
[α
2


































Proof of Claim 2.7
Proof. If the initial short position s > 0, then the negatively informed speculator’s relative
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payoff from buying vs. doing nothing will be
∆b,nl = U
b














































Since the first term 13
1∑
d=−1
πd+1 [Vl − E (Vω |Q = d+ 1)] is less than zero, which is proved
in Claim 2.4. And from Claim 2.6, we have P−1 = 0, P2 = V
+, which means the second
term s3 [P−1 − P2] is also less than zero. Therefore
⇒ ∆b,nl < 0
The negatively informed speculator’s relative payoff from doing nothing vs. selling is
∆n,sl = U
n














































Since the first term 13
1∑
d=−1
πd−1 [Vl − E (Vω |Q = d− 1)] is less than zero, which is proved







, which means the
second term s3 [P−2 − P1] is also less than zero. Therefore
⇒ ∆n,sl < 0
In sum, both ∆b,nl and ∆
n,s







also less than zero, so the negatively informed speculator will always choose to sell.
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Proof of Claim 2.8
Proof. If the initial short position s > 0, then the uninformed speculator’s relative payoff































































V̄ − E (Vω |Q = d+ 1)
]
is less than zero, which is
proved in Claim 2.5. And from Claim 2.6, we have P−1 = 0, P2 = V
+, which means the
second term s3 [P−1 − P2] is also less than zero. Therefore
⇒ ∆b,n∅ < 0































































V̄ − E (Vω |Q = d− 1)
]
is equal to zero, which is proved







, which means the
second term s3 [P−2 − P1] is less than zero. Therefore
⇒ ∆n,s∅ < 0
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In sum, both ∆b,n∅ and ∆
n,s







also less than zero, so the uninformed speculator will always choose to sell.
Proof of Claim 2.9
Proof. If the initial short position s > 0, then the positively informed speculator’s relative
payoff from buying vs. doing nothing will be
∆b,nh = U
b






















































Also Claim 2.6 gives us P−1 = 0, P0 = V̄ , P2 = V




















∆b,nh > 0⇔ s < 1−
V̄
V +








































































∆n,sh > 0⇔ s < 1−
V̄
V +
∆n,sh < 0⇔ s > 1−
V̄
V +
In sum, we have
• If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then ∆b,bh > 0 and ∆
n,s







So the positively informed speculator will always choose to buy.
• If s > 1− V̄
V +
, then ∆b,bh < 0 and ∆
n,s







So the positively informed speculator will always choose to sell.
As for s = 1− V̄
V +
, with all prices given constant, it will be non-generic in this case.
Proof of Claim 2.10
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Proof. If the initial short position s > 0 is revealed, then the negatively informed specula-
tor’s relative payoff from buying vs. doing nothing will be
∆b,nl = U
b














































Since the first term 13
1∑
d=−1
πd+1 [Vl − E (Vω |Q = d+ 1)] is less than zero, which is proved
in Claim 2.4, so next we will discuss the sign of the second term.
s
3
[P−1 − P2] =
s
3
[π−1E (Vω |Q = −1)− π2E (Vω |Q = 2)]
Case 1. If pbh >
2V̄
αV +
, then by Lemma 2 we will have E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0 and P−1 =
0, and by Lemma 2.5 we have E (Vω |Q = 2) > 0 and P2 > 0. Thus the second term
s
3 [P−1 − P2] is less than zero.
Case 2. If 0 < pbh ≤
2V̄
αV +
, then by SCP we have pb∅ = p
b
l = 0.
The expected value of Vω given Q = 2 then will be









V + + pbl
α
2
























] [pbhα2 V +] = V +
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The expected value of Vω given Q = −1 then will be














































2 + (1− α)



















[P−1 − P2] =
s
3













E (Vω |Q = −1)− V +
]
− (1− π−1)V +
]
< 0




l = 0. In this case all three types
speculators will not choose to buy, which leaves Q = 2 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading
result. Then D1 implies that the deviator is positively informed, thus the expected value
of Vω will be E (Vω |Q = 2) = V +.
Meanwhile, the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 is
















































V − + (1− α) V̄
]




[P−1 − P2] =
s
3









In sum s3 [P−1 − P2] is less than zero in all three cases, therefore
⇒ ∆b,nl < 0
Then we consider the negatively informed speculator’s relative payoff from doing nothing
vs. selling, which is
∆n,sl = U
n














































Since the first term 13
1∑
d=−1
πd−1 [Vl − E (Vω |Q = d− 1)] is less than zero, which is proved
in Claim 2.4, so next we will discuss the sign of the second term.
s
3
[P−2 − P1] =
s
3
[π−2E (Vω |Q = −2)− π1E (Vω |Q = 1)]
Case 1. If psh < 1 −
2V̄
αV +
, then by Lemma 3 we will have E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0 and
P−2 = 0, and by Lemma 2.4 we have E (Vω |Q = 1) > 0 and P1 > 0. Thus the second term
s
3 [P−2 − P1] is less than zero.
Case 2. If 1− 2V̄
αV +
≤ psh < 1, then by SCP we have ps∅ = p
s
l = 1.
The expected value of Vω given Q = 1 then will be








































)] [(1− psh) α2 V +] = V +
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The expected value of Vω given Q = −2 then will be









V + + psl
α
2



























2 + (1− α)
] [pshα2 V + + α2 V − + (1− α) V̄ ]
=
[






















[P−2 − P1] =
s
3













E (Vω |Q = −2)− V +
]
− (1− π−2)V +
]
< 0




l = 1. In this case all three types
speculators will choose to sell, which leaves Q = 1 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading result.
Then D1 implies that the deviator is positively informed, thus the expected value of Vω will
be E (Vω |Q = 1) = V +.
Meanwhile, the expected value of Vω given Q = −2 is









V + + psl
α
2






























V − + (1− α) V̄
]




[P−2 − P1] =
s
3









In sum s3 [P−2 − P1] is less than zero in all three cases, therefore
⇒ ∆n,sl < 0
To sum up, both ∆b,nl and ∆
n,s







is also less than zero, so the negatively informed speculator will always choose to sell.
Proof of Claim 2.11
Proof. If the initial short position s > 0 is revealed, then the uninformed speculator’s


























































Since the second term s3 [P−1 − P2] is less than zero, which is proved in Claim 10, so
next we will discuss the sign of the first term.
First, consider the expected value of Vω given Q = 1, which is


















According to Claim 2.10, we have psl = 1, thus















Case 1. If psh < 1, then the probability of Q = 1 will be










































] [(1− psh) α2 V̄ + (1− ps∅) (1− α) V̄ ] = V̄
Case 2. If psh = 1, then by SCP we have p
s
∅ = 1. In this case all three types speculators
will choose to sell, which leaves Q = 1 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading result. Then
D1 implies that the deviator is positively informed, thus the expected value of Vω will be
E (Vω |Q = 1) = V + > V̄ .
In sum, E (Vω |Q = 1) is greater than V̄ in both cases.
Second, consider the expected value of Vω given Q = 2, which is









V + + pbl
α
2
V − + pb∅ (1− α) V̄
]
According to Claim 2.10, we have pbl = 0, thus









V + + pb∅ (1− α) V̄
]
Case 1. If pbh > 0, then the probability of Q = 2 will be































] [pbhα2 V̄ + pb∅ (1− α) V̄ ] = V̄
Case 2. If pbh = 0, then by SCP we have p
b
∅ = 0. In this case all three types speculators
will not choose to buy, which leaves Q = 2 to be an out-of-equilibrium trading result. Then
D1 implies that the deviator is positively informed, thus the expected value of Vω will be
E (Vω |Q = 2) = V + > V̄ .
In sum, E (Vω |Q = 2) is greater than V̄ in both cases.
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Finally, from Lemma 2.1 we have E (Vω |Q = 0) = V̄ , thus
E (Vω |Q = 2) > V̄ > 0
E (Vω |Q = 1) > V̄ > 0











⇒ ∆b,n∅ < 0
Hence, when the initial short position s > 0 is revealed, the uninformed speculator will
never choose to buy.
Proof of Claim 2.12
Proof. When the initial short position s > 0 is revealed, from Claim 2.10 and 2.11 we have,
psl = 1 and p
b
∅ = 0.
First, if psh > 0, then by SCP we will have p
s
∅ = 1.
Second, if psh = 0, then by Lemma 2.3 we have E (Vω |Q = −2) < 0, so the firm will not
invest when Q = −2, i.e. π−2 = 0. The uninformed speculator’s relative payoff from doing














































































π−1V̄ − P−1 − sP1
]
Then we solve for the price range of P1 and P−1.
Since The expected value of Vω given Q = 1 is





































































So we have the range of price when Q = 1 will be P1 ∈ (V̄ , V +].
Also, the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 is














































2 + (1− α)















































≤ V (0) = V̄
Thus





















π−1V̄ − P−1 − sP1
]
.
Case 1. If pbh >
2V̄
αV +
, then by Lemma 2 we have E (Vω |Q = −1) < 0 and P−1 = 0, so
the firm will not invest when Q = −1, i.e. π−1 = 0.




Case 2. If 0 < pbh ≤
2V̄
αV +










V̄ − P−1 − sP1
]
Let






Since 0 < pbh ≤
2V̄
αV +
, so the positively informed speculator is mixing between buying




[3Vh − P0 − P1 − P2] +
s
3
[P−1 − P2] = 0
Notice that from Lemma 2.1 P0 = V̄ , and the expected value of Vω given Q = 2 is









V + + pbl
α
2
























] [pbhα2 V +] = V +












P−1 − V +
]
= 0
⇒ s = 2V
+ − V̄ − P1
V + − P−1
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Substitute s into δ gives us
⇒ δ = V̄ − P−1 −
2V + − V̄ − P1
V + − P−1
P1
Then we have
δ < 0⇔ V̄ − P−1 −
2V + − V̄ − P1
V + − P−1
P1 < 0
Rearrange the inequality yields
δ < 0⇔ (P−1)2 −
(
V + + V̄
)
P−1 + V
+V̄ < −(P1)2 +
(




f (P−1) = (P−1)
2 −
(





g (P1) = −(P1)2 +
(




f ′ (P−1) = 2P−1 −
(
V + + V̄
)




⇒ f (P−1) ≤ f (0) = V +V̄
Also we have
g′ (P1) = −2P1 +
(




> 0 for P−1 ∈
(
V̄ , V + − V̄2
)
= 0 for P−1 = V
+ − V̄2


























2V + − V̄
)
V̄ = V +V̄ +
(
V + − 2V̄
)
V̄ > V +V̄
notice that this inequality holds due to

















)2 − V +V̄ > V + (2V̄ )− V +V̄ = V +V̄
Together we have

















V + + V̄
)
P−1 + V
+V̄ < −(P1)2 +
(
2V + − V̄
)
P1





Case 3. If pbh = 0, then since also p
s
h = 0, we have p
n
h = 1.
Therefore the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 will be
















































V − + (1− α) V̄
]
= V̄











In sum, ∆n,s∅ is less than zero in all three cases, combine with the result in Claim 2.11






∅ is also less than zero, so the uninformed speculator
will always choose to sell.
To sum up, when the initial short position s > 0 is revealed, we will have ps∅ = 1, the
uninformed speculator will always choose to sell.
Proof of Claim 2.13
Proof. When the initial short position s > 0 is revealed, then from Lemma 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, we
have π0 = π1 = π2 = 1 and P0 = V̄ .
Given that psl = p
s
∅ = 1, then the expected value of Vω given Q = 1 will be








































] [(1− psh) α2 V +] = V +
Also the expected value of Vω given Q = 2 is









V + + pbl
α
2























] [pbhα2 V +] = V +
Thus we have P1 = P2 = V
+.
The relative payoff from buying vs. doing nothing for positively informed speculator is
∆b,nh = U
b









































V + − V̄ − s
(
V + − P−1
)]
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The relative payoff from doing nothing vs. selling for positively informed speculator is
∆n,sh = U
n









































(π−2 + π−1 + 1)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄ − s
(
V + − P−2
)]










(π−2 + π−1 + 2)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − 2V̄ − s
(
2V + − P−2 − P−1
)]
For the positively informed speculator, we can enumerate all different combinations for
the sign of relative payoff in Table A2.6.3
Table A2.6.3: Summary of the Sign of Positively Informed Speculator’s Relative Payoff












+ 0 − + 0 − + 0 −












+ 0 − + 0 − + 0 −












+ 0 − + 0 − + 0 −
strategy n n n × × ns × × s





h , so 14 cases are mathematically impossible, which have been marked
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as ×. For the rest 13 cases, we can reduce them to 7 cases according to the actions being
chosen.
The reduced results are summarized in Table A2.6.4. So next we will discuss these 7
cases in detail.
Table A2.6.4: Reduced Summary of the Sign of Positively Informed Speculator’s Relative
Payoff












+ − +, 0,− + − 0 0
strategy b s n b, n n, s b, s b, n, s
Case 1. If ∆b,nh > 0, ∆
b,s
h > 0, then we have p
b
h = 1, the positively informed speculator
will always choose to buy.
∆b,nh > 0⇒ s <
V + − V̄
V + − P−1
∆b,sh > 0⇒ s <
(π−2 + π−1 + 2)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − 2V̄
2V + − P−2 − P−1
Since pbh = 1, p
s
h = 0, p
n
h = 0, then by Lemma 2.2 and 2.3 we have, π−2 = π−1 = 0,
P−2 = P−1 = 0, thus
⇒

∆b,nh > 0⇒ s < 1−
V̄
V +




⇒ s < 1− V̄
V +
Case 2. If ∆b,nh < 0, ∆
n,s
h > 0, then we have p
n
h = 1, the positively informed speculator
will not choose to trade.
∆b,nh < 0⇒ s >
V + − V̄
V + − P−1
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∆n,sh > 0⇒ s <
(π−2 + π−1 + 1)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄
V + − P−2
Since pnh = 1, p
s
h = 0, p
b
h = 0, then by Lemma 3 we have, π−2 = 0, P−2 = 0. Notice that
the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 is
















































V − + (1− α) V̄
]
= V̄
So we have π−1 = 1, and P−1 = V̄ , thus
⇒

∆b,nh < 0⇒ s > 1




⇒ 1 < s < 2− 2V̄
V +
Case 3. If ∆n,sh < 0, ∆
b,s
h < 0, then we have p
s
h = 1, the positively informed speculator
will always choose to sell.
∆b,sh < 0⇒ s >
(π−2 + π−1 + 2)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − 2V̄
2V + − P−2 − P−1
∆n,sh < 0⇒ s >
(π−2 + π−1 + 1)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄
V + − P−2
Since psh = 1, p
b
h = 0, p
n
h = 0, then the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 is




















































Also the expected value of Vω given Q = −2 is









V + + psl
α
2






























V − + (1− α) V̄
]
= V̄
So we have π−2 = π−1 = 1, and P−2 = P−1 = V̄ , thus
⇒

∆n,sh < 0⇒ s > 3
∆b,sh < 0⇒ s > 2

⇒ s > 3
Case 4. If ∆b,nh = 0, ∆
n,s
h > 0, ∆
b,s
h > 0, then we have p
s




h = 1, the
positively informed speculator will mix between buying and doing nothing.
∆b,nh = 0⇒ s =
V + − V̄
V + − P−1
∆n,sh > 0⇒ s <
(π−2 + π−1 + 1)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄
V + − P−2
Since psh = 0, then by Lemma 2.3 we have, π−2 = 0, P−2 = 0. Notice that the expected
value of Vω given Q = −1 is














































2 + (1− α)
















































≤ V (0) = V̄
Thus
















∆b,nh = 0⇒ s =
V + − V̄







∆n,sh > 0⇒ s <
(π−1 + 1)V
+ − P−1 − V̄
V +
Substitute s into the inequality, yields
















































Thus the inequality will always hold for 1− V̄
V +
< s ≤ 1, 0 < P−1 ≤ V̄ . As for P−1 = 0,
we need s = 1− V̄
V +
, which is then non-generic in this case.
Case 5. If ∆b,nh < 0, ∆
n,s
h = 0, ∆
b,s
h < 0, then we have p
b




h = 1, the
positively informed speculator will mix between doing nothing and selling.
∆n,sh = 0⇒ s =
(π−2 + π−1 + 1)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄
V + − P−2
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∆b,nh < 0⇒ s >
V + − V̄
V + − P−1
Since the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 is
















































V − + (1− α) V̄
]
=V̄
then we have π−1 = 1, and P−1 = V̄ .
Also the expected value of Vω given Q = −2 is









V + + psl
α
2



























2 + (1− α)
] [pshα2 V + + α2 V − + (1− α) V̄ ]
=
[







































⇒ V (pnh) ≤ V (0) = V̄
Thus
















∆n,sh = 0⇒ s =
(π−2 + 2)V
+ − P−2 − 2V̄





V + − 2V̄
)
V + − P−2
> 1
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∆b,nh < 0⇒ s > 1
Thus the second inequality will always hold in this case, so next we will solve for the
range of s
When 0 < P−2 ≤ V̄ , then we have π−2 = 1
⇒ s = 3V
+ − P−2 − 2V̄
V + − P−2
= 1 +
2V + − 2V̄




When 0 < P−2 ≤ V̄ , then we have π−2 ∈ [0, 1]










Together we have, 2− 2V̄
V +
≤ s ≤ 3.
Notice that in order to make the firm mixing between invest and not invest, we need
the expected value of Vω given Q = −2 to be zero, which means
E (Vω |Q = −2) =
[






















Case 6. If ∆b,nh > 0, ∆
n,s
h < 0, ∆
b,s
h = 0, then we have p
n




h = 1, the
positively informed speculator will mix between buying and selling.
∆b,sh = 0⇒ s =
(π−2 + π−1 + 2)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − 2V̄
2V + − P−2 − P−1
∆b,nh > 0⇒ s <
V + − V̄
V + − P−1
First, when pbh <
2V̄
αV +
, since pnh = 0, then p
s
h < 1 −
2V̄
αV +
. By Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, we
will have π−2 = π−1 = 0 and P−2 = P−1 = 0.
⇒

∆b,sh = 0⇒ s = 1−
V̄
V +




⇒ s ∈ ∅
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Second, when pbh =
2V̄
αV +






The expected value of Vω given Q = −1 will be


































V − + (1− α) V̄
]
= 0
The expected value of Vω given Q = −2 will be









V + + psl
α
2
















V − + (1− α) V̄
]
= 0
Thus we have, P−1 = P−2 = 0.
⇒












⇒ s ∈ ∅
Finally, when pbh <
2V̄
αV +






The expected value of Vω given Q = −1 will be














































2 + (1− α)




























































⇒ 0 < E (Vω |Q = −1) ≤ V̄
The expected value of Vω given Q = −2 will be









V + + psl
α
2



























2 + (1− α)
] [pshα2 V + + α2 V − + (1− α) V̄ ]
=
[















] = E (Vω |Q = −1)
Thus
⇒ 0 < E (Vω |Q = −2) ≤ V̄
So we have, π−2 = π−1 = 1, P−2 ∈ (0, V̄ ] and P−1 ∈ (0, V̄ ].
⇒

∆b,sh = 0⇒ s =
4V +−P−1−P−2−2V̄
2V +−P−1−P−2 = 1 +
2V +−2V̄
2V +−P−1−P−2 > 1
∆b,nh > 0⇒ s <
V +−V̄
V +−P−1 ≤ 1

⇒ s ∈ ∅
In sum, there is no such s exists to make positively informed speculator mix between
buying and selling.
Case 7. If ∆b,nh = 0, ∆
n,s
h = 0, ∆
b,s






h = 1, the positively
informed speculator will mix between buying, selling and doing nothing.
∆b,nh = 0⇒ s =
V + − V̄
V + − P−1
∆n,sh = 0⇒ s =
(π−2 + π−1 + 1)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄




V + − V̄
V + − P−1
s2 =
(π−2 + π−1 + 1)V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄
V + − P−2
First, when pbh <
2V̄
αV +
, then the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 is














































2 + (1− α)











] ∈ (0, V̄ ]
The expected value of Vω given Q = −2 is









V + + psl
α
2



























2 + (1− α)
] [pshα2 V + + α2 V − + (1− α) V̄ ]
=
[











] ∈ [0, V̄ ]







+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄
V + − P−2
≥ 2V
+ − P−2 − P−1 − V̄
V + − P−2
= 1 +
V + − P−1 − V̄
V + − P−2
≥ 1 + V




V + − V̄
V + − P−1
< 1 +
V + − P−1 − V̄
V +
⇔ 0 < (P−1)2 −
(








θ (P−1) = (P−1)
2 −
(







θ′ (P−1) = 2P−1 + V̄ − 3V + < 0 for P−1 ∈ (0, V̄ ]







)2 − 3V +V̄ + 2(V̄ )2 = (V + − V̄ ) (V + − 2V̄ ) > 0











⇒ s1 < 1 +
V + − P−1 − V̄
V +
Since s1 < 1 +
V +−P−1−V̄
V +
≤ s2, then we have s ∈ ∅.
Second, when pbh ≥
2V̄
αV +
, then psh ≤ 1 −
2V̄
αV +
. The expected value of Vω given Q = −1
will be














































2 + (1− α)



























And the expected value of Vω given Q = −2 will be









V + + psl
α
2



























2 + (1− α)
] [pshα2 V + + α2 V − + (1− α) V̄ ]
=
[































Thus we have P−1 = P−2 = 0.
⇒ s1 =
V + − V̄




(π−2 + π−1 + 1)V
+ − V̄
V +
Then let s1 = s2, gives us
s1 = s2 ⇒





⇒ (π−2 + π−1)V + = 0
⇒ π−2 = π−1 = 0
Therefore
s = 1− V̄
V +
which is non-generic in this case.
In sum of all these 7 cases, we will have the trading strategies for the positively informed
speculator as follow:
• If s < 1 − V̄
V +
, then pbh = 1, the positively informed speculator will always choose to
buy.
• If 1 − V̄
V +
< s ≤ 1, then pbh + pnh = 1, the positively informed speculator will mix
between buying and doing nothing.
• If 1 < s < 2− 2V̄
V +
, then pnh = 1, the positively informed speculator will always choose
not to trade.
• If 2 − 2V̄
V +
≤ s ≤ 3, then pnh + psh = 1, the positively informed speculator will mix
between doing nothing and selling.
• If 3 < s, then psh = 1, the positively informed speculator will always choose to sell.
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Proof of Claim 2.14
Proof. When the initial short position s > 0 is revealed, the speculator’s strategies are given
by Claim 2.10-2.13, so according to Lemma 2.1-2.5, we have the firm’s investment strategies
will then be implied as:
• If s < 1 − V̄
V +
, then firm will invest when Q = 0, 1, 2, and will not invest when
Q = −1,−2.
• If 1− V̄
V +
< s < 2− 2V̄
V +
, then firm will invest when Q = −1, 0, 1, 2, and will not invest
when Q = −2.
• If 2− 2V̄
V +
≤ s, then firm will always choose to invest, i.e. invest whenQ = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2.
As for the pricing strategies of the market maker, if s < 1− V̄
V +
, then the firm chooses
not to invest when Q = −1,−2, thus we have P−1=P−2=0. Since the positively informed
speculator is the only type who will choose to buy, so we have P1=P2=V
+. Finally, we
have P0=V̄ by Lemma 2.1.
If 1− V̄
V +
< s < 2− 2V̄
V +
, then firm will choose not to invest when Q = −2, thus we have
P−2=0. Since the positively informed speculator is the only type who will choose to buy,
so we have P1=P2=V
+. Notice that the expected value of Vω given Q = −1 is














































2 + (1− α)




















. Finally, we have P0=V̄ by Lemma 2.1.
If 2− 2V̄
V +
≤ s, then firm will always choose to invest, i.e. invest when Q = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2.
In this case, D1 implies P1=P2=V
+. And since Q = −1, 0 conveys no information, the price
77
should be P−1 = P0 = V̄ . Finally, the expected value of Vω given Q = −2 is given by









V + + psl
α
2



























2 + (1− α)
] [pshα2 V + + α2 V − + (1− α) V̄ ]
=
[





















Below is the summary of the market maker’s pricing strategies:
• If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then market maker will set the prices as
P1 = P2 = V
+
P0 = V̄
P−1 = P−2 = 0
• If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then market maker will set the prices as















• If s < 1− V̄
V +
, then market maker will set the prices as
P1 = P2 = V
+
P0 = P−1 = V̄
P−2 =
[













CHAPTER 3. UNDERSUBSCRIPTION RISK, UNDERPRICING,
AND UNDERREACTION IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Using theoretical and simulation tools, we study how strategic risk among investors
can help explain both underpricing and underreaction in initial public offerings (IPOs).
We assume the post-IPO value of a firm is higher if the IPO raises more capital for the
firm. Hence an IPO subscriber faces strategic risk: the value of subscribing depends on
the aggregate subscription rate. As this risk is resolved immediately after the IPO, the
IPO itself is underpriced. Moreover, since individual investors have limited wealth, a higher
offer price raises the risk of undersubscription. Investors respond by demanding a larger
discount: the offer price appears to underreact to public news.
3.1 Introduction
Initial public offering (IPO) is an important milestone for entrepreneurial firms. The
proceeds from IPO can help to finance the future growth of firms and make them more liquid
through stock market trading. IPO also provides a way for trading the company’s shares,
enabling its existing shareholders to diversify their investments and to crystallize their
capital gains from backing the company. The act of IPO itself helps improve the reputation
of the company, and the attendant publicity may bring indirect benefits, such as attracting
more talented managers and lowering the cost of funding the company’s operations and
investments.
An important aspect of the IPO process is the underpricing of newly issued shares,
representing a discount from its fair market price measured by the difference between the
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closing price on the first day of trading and the IPO offer price. IPO underpricing is one
of the best-documented empirical findings in finance and the underpricing phenomenon is
persistent over time and across countries. Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) documented
that when companies go public, the shares they sell tend to be underpriced, in that the share
price jumps substantially on the first day of trading. Ljungqvist (2004) provides evidence
of underpricing in United States from 1960 to 2003, in main countries of Europe from 1990
to 2003 and in main countries of Asia-Pacific and Latin America from 1990 to 2001. To be
specific, in United States,there are 8, 249 IPOs from 1980 to 2016. The average first-day
return for the IPOs is 17.9% (equally-weighted average return) and the aggregate amount of
“money left on the table” is $155.14 billion, where the “money left on the table” is defined
as the first-day price gain multiplied by the number of shares sold. Compared with the
total proceeds of IPO ($839.65 billion), 18.5% of firms’ potential proceeds has been left to
the investors. Figure 3.1 displays the mean first-day return and “money left on the table”
for IPOs in United States from 1980-2016. Such “money left on the table” constitutes a
substantial opportunity cost of going public for issuing firms. However,owners and managers
seem unconcerned about situations of underpricing. In a survey of chief financial officers
(CFOs) that took their firms public, Krigman et al. (2001) find that CFOs of virtually all
of the most underpriced firms are highly satisfied with the performance of their lead IPO
underwriter.
Why are the firms willing to sacrifice such great amount of money in the process of IPO?
In this paper, we present an explanation for this underpricing phenomenon by examining the
strategic risk in IPO. The concept of strategic risk comes from the global games literature.
Generally, we consider a situation in which payoffs from agents strategies depend on an
uncertain state of the world about which agents obtain very informative but noisy signals.
Because agents do not have the same assessments of the state of the world, this creates
strategic uncertainty in equilibrium. The risk comes from this kind of uncertainty is called
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strategic risk. Strategic risk is widely examined in researches on global games1.
Figure 3.1: IPO Underpricing in US
However, strategic risk is seldom examined in literature on IPO. In our setting, shares
sold in an IPO are more valuable if the firm reaps more revenue from the IPO. There are
two motivations for this assumption. Trivially, a firm can use its IPO proceeds productively
which lets it pay higher dividends in the future. In addition, Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner
(2001) suggest that the success of a firm’s IPO acts as a quality signal to the firm’s small
stakeholders, who may choose whether or not to do business with the firm or to adopt the
firm’s platform. Such stakeholders may include customers, suppliers, makers of ancillary
products such as software and replacement parts, and potential future investors. For the firm
to survive and thrive, such stakeholders must be willing to do business with it. Importantly,
this informational effect may be large even if a firm seeks relatively little capital in its IPO.
With the assumption that liquidating dividend is increasing in IPO proceeds, investors in
1For example, see Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin(1998), Chassang and Miquel(2010)
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an IPO face strategic risk: the value of the shares depends on the IPO’s success, which
depends on other investors’ decisions to subscribe.
We will show in a global games setting that the strategic risk leads to underpricing.
Intuitively, an agent’s reservation price is the price at which she is just willing to subscribe
to the IPO. But if, given her information about the IPO, she is indeed just willing to
subscribe, then she knows that some others are likely to have received slightly more negative
information than her own and thus will choose not to subscribe. Hence, her reservation
price reflects a positive probability of undersubscription, which - if it occurs - will lower the
firm’s value. Once the IPO concludes and the subscription rate is known, this strategic risk
disappears. Accordingly, shares trade at a higher price in the aftermarket.2
Strategic risk can generate underreaction as well. The term underreaction describes the
well-documented fact that the final offer price does not fully react to favorable information
received in the process of pricing IPO, which indicates that the price revision over the course
of bookbuilding and the first-day underpricing return are positively correlated3. Intuitively,
when good news tells the firm that the IPO is more attractive to investors, the firm can raise
the IPO price. But since individual investors have limited wealth, a higher offer price raises
the risk of undersubscription. Hence the risk of undersubscription is now greater: investors
face even more strategic risk. Thus, this price revision worsens underpricing, which appears
in the data as underreaction.
Besides, our empirical result shows that underpricing is positively correlated with over-
subscription, our model can also give an explanation for this. Intuitively, since firm sees
only a noisy signal of fundamentals. Being concerned with the risk of undersubscription,
when the firm observes a bad signal and is overly pessimistic, it will lower its offer price
to attract more investor to subscribe. Therefore, there is more underpricing and more
2Underpricing in this model does not require risk aversion. Rather, it occurs because the firm must
charge a low share price in order to induce the agents to subscribe in the presence of undersubscription risk.
Indeed, our model assumes risk-neutrality; under risk aversion, the underpricing would be worse.




Historically, there are four main kinds of explanations for IPO underpricing. The first
kind of explanation for underpricing claims that it is due to winner’s curse 4 : when the firm’s
growth prospects are high, informed investors will subscribe, shrinking the stock available to
retail investors. Since retail investors face a winner’s curse, they are not willing to pay the
firm the true value of its shares. This kind of explanation shows how underpricing happens.
However, it did not explain for the underraction phenomenon and the positively relationship
between oversubscription and underpricing. The second explanation of underpricing is the
signal of firm quality5. If companies have better information about the present value or risk
of their future cash flows than do investors, underpricing may be used to signal the companys
“true” high value. This is clearly costly, but if successful, signaling may allow the issuer to
return to the market to sell equity on better prices at a later date. This explanation does not
explain for the underreaction phenomenon and the relationship between oversubscription
and underpricing, either.
The third explanation for underpricing is moral hazard6. Intuitively, a firm conducts an
IPO through a third party underwriter. The underwriting has an incentive to reward itself
or top clients with underpriced shares. This theory can also be used to explain underreaction
in IPO. However, this theory does not take the subscription rate into account. The fourth
explanation is information revelation theories. Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste
and Wilhelm (1990), and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) show that if some investors are better
informed than either the company or other investors, underwriter has the incentive to design
a mechanism through the process of bookbuilding which will induce investors to reveal their
information truthfully by making it in their best interest to do so. To ensure truth-telling,
the allocations have to involve underpriced stock. In this explanation, IPO underpricing
serves as the cost of extracting the informed investors private information. Bookbuilding
4For example, see Rock (1986)
5For example, see Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989)
6See Baron and Holmstrm (1980), and Baron (1982)
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allows firms to extract positive information and raise the offer price in response even though
the price will rise further in the after-market because some money has to be left on the table.
Thus the price revision over the course of bookbuilding and the first-day underpricing
return are positively correlated. This setting can also explain the phenomenon of IPO
underreaction. But it does not take the subscription into account, either.
This paper differs from the related literature in the following ways. First, unlike the the-
ory of winner’s curse and signaling, our model can explain the phenomenon of underpricing
and underreaction at the same time. Although the theory of moral hazard and informa-
tion revelation can also explain the underreaction, they did not take the subscription into
account, which ignores the relationship between underpricing and oversubscription. Our
theory can explain all these three phenomena. Second, different from the explanation of
winner’s curse, information revealing and signaling, there is no need for us to assume that
there is a information gap (some investors are informed and some are uninformed) among
investors. In fact, we can show that even when the investors share the same information,
underpricing may still exist in our setting. Third, unlike the explanations which referred
to moral hazard and psychological reasons, our paper assumes that all agents engaged in
the IPO process are fully rational. With the assumption that moral hazard caused the un-
derpricing, Baron and Holmstrm (1980), Baron (1982) construct a screening model where
the uninformed party offers a menu, from which the informed party selects the one that is
optimal given her unobserved type in the road show process. However, this kind of road
show commitment is not widely observed in reality. Our paper gets rid of this commitment
and tends to be more realistic. Fourth, our paper takes the endogeneity of stock value into
consideration, which has seldom been examined before in the studies of IPO. IPO revenue
can be used to finance firm’s investment and a successful IPO will help to improve firm’s
reputation. So firm’s value, and hence the stock value, may be affected by the IPO process




There is a fixed measure m > 0 of agents, each endowed with one unit of capital. There
is also a single firm with a worthwhile project. All participants are risk-neutral and fully
rational. The firm is assumed already to have initiated the process of an IPO, paid all filing
fees, etc.





The state θ can be thought of as the unobserved quality of the firm’s project. We regard
the public signal y as being revealed during the firm’s road show. On seeing y, the firm
decides whether to go forward with the IPO or to withdraw it.
If the firm goes forward and raises k units of capital in the IPO, its final value is eθf (k)
where f is a differentiable and strictly increasing function that satisfies
ι
d






∈ (0,∞) . (3.1)
If the firm withdraws the IPO, its final value is eθf (c) where c > 0 is a known constant.
Interpreting c literally, it equals the fixed cost of carrying out the IPO versus withdrawing
it. However it can also capture the equivalent, in terms of lost capital, of the damage
from an IPO that spectacularly fails versus one that is quietly withdrawn in the face of of
“adverse market conditions”.
Assume henceforth that the firm decides to go forward with the IPO. It then announces
a number s ∈ [0, 1] of shares that are offered for sale, as well as a price p ≥ 0 per share.
Rather than working with s directly, it is more convenient to assume the firm chooses a
price p and a capital target t = ps ∈ [0, p]; the number of shares s is then given by t/p.
We will assume, without loss of generality, that the capital target t does not exceed the
aggregate capital m of the agents as the firm cannot raise more than m units of capital.
After the firm announces p and t, each agent i ∈ [0,m] then sees a private signal




, σ > 0 is a scalar, and θ and the εi’s are all
7This can be obtained most simply if θ is uniformly distributed on the whole real line and y equals the




is independent of θ. In section 3.3.1.1, we present an alternative
derivation in which the prior distribution of θ is normal.
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mutually independent. The agents then decide simultaneously whether or not to subscribe:
to offer to buy up to 1/p shares at the price p.8 Figure 3.2 shows the time line of the IPO
model.
Figure 3.2: Timeline of the IPO Model
Let ` ∈ [0,m] be the measure of agents who subscribe or, equivalently, the amount of
capital bid by the agents (as each has one unit). If ` does not exceed the capital target
t, each subscriber transfers her capital to the firm in return for 1/p shares. If instead `
exceeds t, the IPO is rationed: each subscriber transfers t/` < 1 units of capital in return
in return for t/ (`p) < 1/p shares while the firm raises t units of capital. An agent’s sole
alternative investment is a risk-free asset that pays a zero net return. Hence, an agent’s net
realized payoff from subscribing is













if ` ∈ [t,m]
(3.2)
while the firm’s realized payoff is
Πtp (θ, `) =
(
1− min {t, `}
p
)
eθf (min {t, `}) .
8An agent cannot offer to buy more shares since she has only one unit of capital to invest. We say ”offer
to buy” because demand for shares can exceed supply, in which case the IPO is rationed. (See below.)
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An implication is that the firm’s maximum payoff from a capital target t < c is less than
its payoff, eθf (c), from withdrawing the IPO. Thus, if the firm carries out the IPO, it will
choose a capital target
t ∈ [c,m] . (3.3)
The following standard result from probability theory will be used without proof.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose we have a variable θ ∼ N(y, Vθ) to estimate. We observe the
variables xj = θ + εj for j = 1, ..., J , where each εj ∼ N(0, Vj) is independent of every εj′
and of θ. Define the precision of variable j to be wj = 1/Vj. Define x0 = y, V0 = Vθ, and










By Proposition 3.1, conditional on the public signal y and the private signal xi, the state θ
















A threshold equilibrium is one in which an agent i invests if and only if her posterior
mean θxi is not less than some threshold κ, which may depend on the public signal y and




























9Below we give sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique threshold equilibrium.
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by the law of large numbers. Hence, if an agent has posterior mean θ and thinks that each


















We will assume two conditions that jointly imply the existence of a unique threshold









where h (z) = Φ
′(z)
1−Φ(z) denotes the standard normal hazard function. Second, the public















Our main result is as follows. It shows that there is a unique threshold equilibrium
where agents will only invest if their posterior judgement for the mean state θxi exceeds
the threshold at which the relative payoff from subscribing is zero. Intuitively, if an agent
gets a high private signal which indicates that the state is good, he will then expect a good
performance of the firm. From his point of view, he believes that other agents also tend to
observe a high private signal which encourage them to expect a good state. Since good state
means higher firm value, agents are more likely to subscribe. So, in this way, given other
agents are adopting threshold strategies (investing if they believes that the posterior state
mean is higher than a threshold), an agent will also adopt the threshold strategy to get a
positive expected payoff if he has a high enough posterior mean state. At the threshold, the
expected payoff should be zero: if the expected payoff is negative, agents will not subscribe;
if the expected payoff is positive, agents are then willing to subscribe at a lower posterior
mean state.
Theorem 3.1. Assume (3.9) and (3.10). For any choices p and t of the firm, the agents
have a unique threshold equilibrium, where the subscription threshold κ is the unique solution
to πt∗p,y (κ, κ) = 0.
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Proof. Follows directly from Claims 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. See Appendix.
3.3 The Simulation
In this section, we will do a simulation to the theoretical model and compare the simu-
lation result to the empirical data.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
We now show how to simulate the large-noise model. We begin with some preliminaries.
3.3.1.1 Making y Stochastic
We have assumed that the state θ is normal with constant mean y. Hence the firm will
(for generic parameters) have a unique optimal IPO price p. In order to obtain a distribution
of IPO prices (and thus of price revisions), the mean y must instead be stochastic. We




as itself a posterior distribution
that results from seeing a public signal of θ which can be interpreted as information that
arises from the road show. The mean y then varies with the realization of this public signal.
In short, we will be able to assume that y is normal with zero mean and an arbitrary





τ must be chosen to satisfy (3.10).
To see why, let us now suppose that the true prior distribution of the state θ is
N (0, Vθ).
10 Before anyone acts, all participants see a public signal Z = θ + η of the
state, where the signal noise η ∼ N (0, Vη) is independent of θ. By the usual formula for the
sum of two independent normal variables, unconditional on θ, the public signal Z is normal
with mean E [Z] = 0 and variance V ar (Z) = Vθ + Vη. And by Proposition 3.1, given Z,




10The zero mean is a normalization: if the mean µ is nonzero, we can replace θ and the firm value function
f () with θ − µ and eµf (), respectively.
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and variance






Moreover, when viewed as a random variable (as it is a function of the random variable Z),
the posterior expected value y = E [θ|Z] of the state θ is itself normally distributed with
mean
E [y] = E [E [θ|Z]] = Vθ
Vθ + Vη
E [Z] = 0
and variance















3.3.1.2 Bounds on p and t
For each realization y, the we must compute the firm’s optimal price p and capital target
t. The simplest (but not most efficient) way is by grid search. However, the grid must be
finite. Thus, we require upper and lower bounds on each variable. The bounds on t are
simple: t must lie in [c,m]. And conditional on t, the price p cannot be less than t; else the
number s = t/p of shares will exceed one.
It remains to compute an upper bound on p. The idea of the bound is that if the price
is too high, the IPO will raise little capital with high probability, so the IPO is not worth
its cost c. The bound py, which is increasing in the public signal y, is as follows.
Claim 3.1. Given a parameter y, a firm that does an IPO will never choose a price p that
exceeds the bound




f (m)− f (c)






















Proof of Claim 3.1. See Appendix.
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3.3.2 Methodology for the Simulation
We now show how to simulate the model. The procedure is thus as follows. One
first chooses parameters m > 0, c ∈ (0,m), and V > 0. One then chooses a func-
tion f ; for simplicity, we restrict to the two-parameter family f (k) = (a+ k)b where
a, b > 0. Once a and b are selected, equation (3.1) pins down the parameters ι = ab





= ba . Finally, one chooses parameters σ
and τ satisfying (3.9) and (3.10). There thus are seven parameters: (m, c, V, a, b, σ, τ).
In order to draw realizations y from the distribution N (0, V ) we fix some large positive
n and, for each i = 1, ..., n − 1, let yi = V Φ−1 (i/n). As this implies Φ (yi/V ) = i/n,
each yi is that y which occurs at exactly the (i/n)th percentile in the distribution N (0, V ).





















































For each yi in (yi)
n−1
i=1 , one then computes the equilibrium threshold κ
t
p,yi (the threshold
κ that satisfies πt∗p,yi (κ, κ) = 0)





grid. One then searches this grid for the target t and price p that jointly maximize the IPO
payoff


















where “∧” denotes the pairwise minimum and `tp,y (θ) denotes the subscription rate `
κtp,y
θ,y that
results from the equilibrium threshold κtp,y when the state is θ, the public signal is y, and



















. Hence, to find κtp,y one can perform a
bisection search on this finite interval.
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the firm’s choices are (p, t).12. Let us denote the optimal choices as ti and pi, and let Π (yi)
denote the firm’s maximized IPO payoff Π (ti, pi, yi). Let I be the set of indices i for which








from withdrawing the IPO. As the firm will carry out the IPO if and only if i lies in I,
computed moments should thus be restricted to i in I.





. We simulate this distribution












For each yi, we thus assign each θ
j
i the same probability weight (n− 1)
−1. For each θji , the








where ∧ denotes pairwise
minimum and `ji denotes the subscription rate `
κ
θ,y that arises from the parameters θ = θ
j
i




Finally, in order to compute price revisions we require an initial filing price p0, which is
chosen prior to observing y. We will assume for simplicity that the filing price is chosen to
minimize the mean squared pricing error 1|I|
∑
i∈I (pyi − p0)
2 conditional on the IPO going




i∈I pyi of the final IPO prices pyi over
all public signals yi for which the firm chooses to carry out IPO. The quantities of interest
are then computed as follows for each pair (i, j) such that i is in I:








3. Oversubscription: Oji = `
j
i/ti.
12The function `κθ,y is defined in (3.7).
13A formula for `κθ,y appears in equation (3.7).
14It seems reasonable that large price revisions have a reputation cost for the firm’s underwriter. If this
cost is quadratic, we obtain the given formula for p0.
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3.3.3 The Sample Data
The sample we would like to study consists of firms completing an initial public offering
between January 2007 to December 2015 in United States and India. In United States, the
data of subscription in IPO are not available as in many other countries. Fortunately, we
have found that the data of subscription are publicly available in India. So, we add the
data of India to our study. The data of United States comes from Thomson Financial’s
Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The data of India comes from National Stock
Exchange (NSE), Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and Chittorgarh Infotech, a company
which specialized in providing financial information in India15. We exclude unit offers,
closed-end funds (including REITs), financial institutions , ADRs of companies already
listed in their home countries, limited partnerships, and penny stocks (IPOs with offer
prices below five dollars). In addition, we only consider the native companies which is
different from most former empirical studies.
A brief description of the data is in Table 3.1. In the sample, there are 935 IPOs for
United States and 297 IPOs for India. We can see that the mean and median of initial
return for US and India are quite close and they are quite larger than 0 (about 16%- 17%),
which suggests the existence of underpricing in the IPOs in both United States and India.
The means of initial return are much higher than the medians, which suggests that the
distributions skew to the right. The mean of price revision is negative in US, while is
positive in India. But both are relatively small in absolute value. Besidesthe medians of
price revision are quite near 0 for both countries. For the oversubscription variable in India,
we can see that the IPOs in India are generally oversubscribed (most of the oversubscription
values are greater than 1).
Table 3.2 describes the correlations between the key variables in US and India. We can
15The data are collected from the following websites. National Stock Exchange(NSE): https://www.
nseindia.com/products/content/equities/ipos/historical_ipo.htm, Bombay Stock Exchange(BSE):
https://www.bseindia.com/markets/PublicIssues/IPOIssues_new.aspx?expandable=3&id=2&Type=P
and Chittorgarh Infotech: http://www.chittorgarh.com/ipo/reports/ipo_report_listing_day_gain.
asp
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see that the IPOs in both US and India tend to display the characteristic of underreaction:
the price revision is positively correlated with underpricing. This is one of the most im-
portant results indicated from our theoretical model and it is also consistent with previous
studies. Intuitively, good news about the state variable lead firms to raise IPO price, which
induces a higher price revision. Since agents’ wealth is limited, the risk of undersubscription
is now greater: investors face greater strategic risk. This leads to a higher underpricing,
which appears in the data as underreaction. Also, we can see that underpricing is positively
correlated with oversubscription rate.
Table 3.1: Description of Sample data
Underpricing Price Revision Oversubscription
US India US India India
Mean 0.161 0.1683 Mean -0.0287 0.0263 Mean 19.5102
Standard Error 0.009 0.0244 Standard Error 0.0051 0.0035 Standard Error 1.6943
Median 0.0833 0.086 Median 0 0.037 Median 4.51
Mode 0 0.0735 Mode 0 0.0909 Mode 1.11
Standard Deviation 0.2766 0.4197 Standard Deviation 0.156 0.0611 Standard Deviation 29.1998
Sample Variance 0.0765 0.1761 Sample Variance 0.0243 0.0037 Sample Variance 852.6258
Kurtosis 8.9803 4.4852 Kurtosis 0.4542 38.0987 Kurtosis 4.6685
Skewness 2.3456 1.5728 Skewness -0.4775 -4.6714 Skewness 2.1224
Range 2.5664 3.1067 Range 1.1045 0.6616 Range 160.12
Minimum -0.3964 -0.6892 Minimum -0.65 -0.5707 Minimum 0.44
Maximum 2.17 2.4175 Maximum 0.4545 0.0909 Maximum 160.56
Sum 150.4957 49.9854 Sum -26.7969 7.8111 Sum 5794.515
Count 935 297 Count 935 297 Count 297
3.3.4 Simulation Results
Based on the theoretical model, the simulation data are generated by setting default
parameters value as follows: σ=1; τ = 1;m = 2; a = 1; b = 1.1; c = 1;α = 1. We gener-
ate 99 public signals y and 999 economic states θ from their normal distributions which
are described in Section 3.3.2. In the simulation, 21 IPOs are conducted. Therefore, we
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Underpricing Price Revision Oversub
Underpricing 1
Price Revision 0.09713 1
Oversub 0.51064 0.071268 1
have 21*99=20979 data points in the simulation. The key variables in the simulation are
described in Table 3.3. We can see that the data display underpricing in the simulation.
Table 3.4 displays the correlations between the key variables in the simulation. We can
see that the correlation coefficient between underpricing and price revision is 0.128, which
indicates the existance of underreaction. This is consistent with the empirical results in
India and US and the value of the simulated correlation coefficient between underpricing
and price revision is quite similar to the value in India (0.097). The correlation coefficient
between underpricing and oversubscription is 0.6. It shows that there exists a very strong
positive relation between underpricing and oversubscription. This is also consistent with
the empirical result in India and the values of the simulated correlation coefficient between
underpricing and oversubscription are close to that in India. Therefore, our simulation tends
to be consistent with the empirical results for the correlations among underpricing, price
revision and oversubscription. In this way, we provide a simulation result which generates
underpricing and underreaction from the strategic risk of undersubscription, which lends
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additional support to our hypothesis that underpricing and underreaction are caused by the
risk of undersubscription.
Table 3.3: Description of Simulation Data
Price Revision Underpricing Oversubscription
Mean 0 Mean 0.9546 Mean 0.6656
Std Err 0.0021 Std Err 0.0188 Std Err 0.0019
Median -0.0994 Median 0.0495 Median 0.7325
Mode -0.3011 Mode 0 Mode 0.5700
Std Dev 0.3104 Std Dev 2.7258 Std Dev 0.2762
Sample Variance 0.0964 Sample Variance 7.4299 Sample Variance 0.0763
Kurtosis 1.1766 Kurtosis 24.4785 Kurtosis -0.7322
Skewness 1.3685 Skewness 3.9308 Skewness -0.6379
Range 1.1873 Range 39.9483 Range 0.9986
Minimum -0.3025 Minimum -0.9854 Minimum 0.0014
Maximum 0.8848 Maximum 38.9630 Maximum 1
Sum 0 Sum 20026 Sum 13963
Count 20979 Count 20979 Count 20979
Table 3.4: Correlations in Simulation
Price Revision Underpricing Oversubscription
Price Revision 1
Underpricing 0.128378 1
Oversubscription 0.292573 0.602271 1
3.4 Conclusion
This paper examines how strategic risk among investors can help explain both under-
pricing and underreaction in initial public offerings (IPOs). The strategic risk we studied
comes from the assumption that the post-IPO value of a firm can be higher if the IPO
raises more capital for the firm. With this assumption, the value of subscribing depends
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on the aggregate subscription rate. As this risk is resolved immediately after the IPO, the
IPO itself is underpriced. Moreover, since individual investors have limited wealth, a higher
offer price raises the risk of undersubscription. Investors respond by demanding a larger
discount: the offer price appears to underreact to public news.
In this paper, we first use a theoretical model in a global game setting to display the
strategic risk of undersubscription in IPO and show how the undersubscription risk can
lead to underpricing and underreaction. Then, we conduct a simulation for the model and
compare the simulated results to the empirical results in India and US. The simulation
results tend to be consistent with the empirical results, which lends further support for our
hypothesis that the strategic risk of undersubscription can be used to explain underpricing
and underreaciton.
This paper provides a new insight for understanding the underpricing and underreaction
in IPO. Our results suggest that undersubscription risk can be an important concern for
investors who plan to participate in IPO. Also, the introduction of the endogeneity of firm
value in stock market in our analysis may shed new light on the studies of IPOs. These
results can also be useful for policy makers in stock market.
3.5 Appendix: Proofs and Technical Results
We first show that there are dominance regions: that it is strictly dominant (not) to
subscribe when a player’s posterior mean θ is sufficiently high (low). This result does not
assume (3.9) or (3.10).
Claim 3.2. For p and s satisfying t = ps > 0:












< 0 for any κ; (3.15)











> 0 for any κ. (3.16)
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Proof. Since t = ps ≥ c > 0, we must have p > 0 and s > 0. By (3.2),
p ∗ πtp (θ, `) ∈

[
eθι− p, eθf (t)− p
]







, eθf (t)− p
]
if ` ∈ [t,m]
Combining these cases and using t ≥ c and f (t) ≥ ι, we obtain, for all `,






































from which the claim immediately follows.
We next show that if a player believes that others are playing a threshold strategy, then
an increase in her posterior mean θ strengthens her own incentive to subscribe.
Claim 3.3. Assume (3.9) and suppose that some player i believes that each other player j
will play threshold strategy with threshold κ (i.e., subscribe if and only if θxj > κ). Then




from subscribing is increasing in her posterior mean θ.
Proof. For any ε, let θ
′




































































































p,y (θ, κ) if `
κ
θ,y ≥ t




















































To ensure that Γ
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as t ≥ c. By (3.9),
then, (3.18) holds whenever `κθ,y ≥ t.
By Claim 3.3, a finite threshold κ is an equilibrium if and only if a player’s relative




is zero when her posterior mean θ equals the threshold κ:
if and only if














equals zero. Claim 3.2 implies that πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is positive (negative) for sufficiently high
(low) thresholds κ. The next claim states that under (3.10), πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is continuous and
increasing in κ.
Claim 3.4. 1. πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is continuous in κ. 2. Assume (3.10). Then π
t∗
p,y (κ, κ) is
strictly increasing in κ wherever πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is zero.
Proof. Part 1. Obvious as πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is defined in terms of continuous functions. Part 2.















































































































p,y (θ, κ) if `
κ
θ,y ≥ t

































. Let θκt,y be the state θ at which `
κ
θ,y = t. By (3.7), `
κ
θ,y is increasing in θ, so θ ≷ θ
κ
t,y
as `κθ,y ≷ t. By (3.2) and (3.8), we can write π
t∗




















. Using (3.21) we can
write ddκπ
t∗
p,y (κ, κ) as the sum A
′ +B′ where A′ denotes
∫
θ:`κθ,y≤t





















is negative (positive) for all states θ below (above) some threshold
θ∗ that depends on t, p, and κ. Hence, if πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is zero, then A < 0 < B. To show
that ddκπ
t∗
p,y (κ, κ) is positive, it thus suffices to show that A
′ > 0 and B′ > B. For the

























. Thus, by (3.10), Λtp,y (θ, κ) is positive when
















by (3.10), is less than τ
2
σ . Thus, Λ
t











B′ > B as claimed.
Proof of Claim 3.1. We first require the following preliminary result:
Lemma 3.1. For any ε > 0 and real number θ0 satisfying





















































where g (z) = zτ − z2/2. As g is strictly concave and has a slope of -1 at z = τ + 1, it
follows that
g (z) ≤ g (τ + 1)− (z − τ − 1) = τ2 + (τ + 1) /2− z































Finally, the right hand side of (3.25) is less than ε if and only if (3.22) holds.
For any public signal y, let κtp,y denote the subscription threshold that results from the









`tp,y (θ) = `
κtp,y
θ,y (3.27)
denote the subscription rate that results from the public signal y and the firm’s choices
(p, t) when the state is θ.16 By Claim 3.2, κtp,y is not less than ln p − ln f (m) − S2/2. By
(3.7), this implies a bound on the subscription rate at θ given y and the choices (p, t):






ln p− ln f (m)− S2/2
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As this bound is increasing in the state θ, for any price p the subscription rate `tp,y (θ) is at







ln p− ln f (m)− S2/2
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[f (m)− f (c)]
16The function `κθ,y is defined in (3.7).
17The bound in (3.29) is obtained by setting the bound in (3.28) equal to c/2 and solving for θ.
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f (c/2)− f (c)
f (m)− f (c)
ey+τ
2/2.
By Lemma 3.1, this must hold if
θp,y > τ
[















f (c/2)− f (c)





τ3 + τ2 + τ
2




f (c/2)− f (c)
f (m)− f (c)
)
which by (3.29) can be transformed to p > py. Q.E.D.
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CHAPTER 4. BROKERAGE CHOICE, DUAL AGENCY AND
HOUSING MARKET STRENGTH
This study develops a theoretical model supported by empirical evidence examining the
relation between brokerage choice and market strength. Our model shows that although
internal transactions (where both buyer and seller agents are either the same or work for the
same firm) have the potential side benefits of higher commission and lower search costs to
an agent, in a strong housing market, most brokerage firms still prefer external transactions
because of the greater demand for housing. However, when the market weakens, external
demand for housing decreases, and brokerage firms become more willing to engage in inter-
nal transactions. This occurs at the expense of lowering the selling price, which speaks to a
principal-agent incentive misalignment problem. Our model demonstrates that the housing
market has a self-correction mechanism for the principal-agent incentive misalignment prob-
lem as the market strengthens. Conversely, when the market weakens, internal transactions
increase and prices in the market decline, which can further weaken the market. Hence, the
equilibrium brokerage choice creates a self-reinforcing mechanism toward generating more
extreme market conditions.
4.1 Introduction
Owner-occupied housing units totaled approximately 27 trillion dollars in 2017Q1, mak-
ing residential real estate one of the most important asset classes in the United States1.
Han and Hong (2016) report that over 80% of buyers and sellers employ licensed real estate
1See Table B.100 entitled Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations in the Federal Re-
serves Flow of Funds Report, which can be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/.
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agents when transacting homes. An agents primary services can be separated into two basic
functions: (1) matching, where a real estate agent assists sellers and buyers in finding a
suitable trading partner, and then once a match is made, (2) bargaining, where the agent
assists the buyer and/or seller in negotiating the terms and conditions of a purchase/sale
agreement (Miceli, Pancak, and Sirmans, 2000).
Many studies have examined the role of agents in the housing market. Some focus on the
distortion of agency incentives (Gruber and Owings, 1996; Garmaise and Moskowitz,2004;
Mehran and Stulz, 2007; Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magne, 2009). Others examine social
inefficiencies resulting from free entry into the real estate brokerage industry (Hsieh and
Moretti, 2003; Barwick and Pathak, 2015). Some use search models to explain agency
behavior (Yinger 1981; Arnold 1999). Many focus on how brokerage firms affect the relation
between selling price and time on the market (Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin 1991; Yavas
and Yang 1995; Forgey, Rutherford and Springer 1996; Huang and Palmquist 2001; Knight
2002; Turnbull and Dombrow 2006 and Turnbull, Dombrow and Sirmans 2006).
When transacting residential real estate, it can be the case that the buyer and seller
are represented by agents who work at different brokerage firms (Han and Hong 2016).
Henceforth, we refer to these as external transactions. When the buyer and seller are
represented by different agents who happen to work at the same firm, we refer to this
relationship throughout the paper as an internal transaction. Finally, when the buyer and
seller are represented by the same agent, we refer to this special case of internal transaction
as a dual agent transaction. Figure 4.1 displays the relationship between these transaction
types. These three brokerage structures have been the source of many studies. For example,
Roskelley (2008) offers explanations for transaction distortions for internal transactions
based on misaligned incentives and the countervailing force of reputational capital originally
investigated in Shapiro (1982, 1983) and Diamond (1989)2. Richard and Phillip (2005) use
2Internal transactions are sometimes referred to in the literature as dual agency transactions. However,
because terms have historically varied widely, confusion in the current study is avoided by only referring to
the three brokerage relationships described in the Introduction.
105
repeat sale methods to test for the price effect associated with internal transactions.
Figure 4.1: Three Types of Transactions Based on Brokerage Structure
In this paper we seek to answer the following questions: (1) When do agents prefer to
engage in external versus internal transactions? (2) How do internal transactions, and in
particular dual agent transactions, affect sale price? (3) Do these brokerage choices change
depending on the strength of the housing market? Our research questions are motivated by
the following studies. Gardiner et al. (2007) examine the effect of a law change in Hawaii
in 1984 requiring full disclosure of internal transactions and find that internal transactions
reduced the sale price, but the effect was much smaller after the legislation (8.0 % versus 1.4
%). Moreover, they also find that internal transactions reduce time on the market by about
8.5% pre-legislation and 8.1% post-legislation. Evans and Kolbe (2005) investigate the effect
of internal transactions on price appreciation for houses that are sold twice and find that
internal transactions in the first sale have no impact on price appreciation. They also find
very limited evidence that an internal transaction in the second sale has a negative effect
on price appreciation. Han and Hong (2016) examine to what extent internal transactions
are explained by agents strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency and find that
agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded. Such
effects become weaker when consumers are more aware of agents incentives. Johnson et al.
(2015) find that internal transaction distortions on sale price emerge after controlling for
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the ownership of the property and that such price distortions were different in the periods
before and after the financial crisis.
Our study attempts to examine these questions from a new perspective. Specifically, how
will the preference for brokerage type change when market strength changes. Moreover, after
controlling for market strength, what happens to home prices in internal versus external
transactions.
The preference for internal versus external transactions based on relative market strength
is motivated by Kadiyali, Prince, and Simon (2011). According to their paper, agents face
a variety of incentives and disincentives to engage in behaviors that increase the likelihood
of an internal transaction. An internal transaction can be preferred because it allows for
a collection of commission on both the buyer and seller side of the ledger. Moreover, an
internal transaction may result in a more streamlined closing process allowing the agent to
more quickly move onto the next sale. Alternatively, an external sale allows for a potentially
much larger buyer pool and therefore a potentially greater selling price and shorter time on
the market.
Given the incentives and disincentives provided within the brokerage framework, one
may naturally ask how these might change as market conditions change. Motivated by this
idea, our study examines how agent preferences for internal transactions change when the
market strengthens. To study this question, we first build a theoretical model which shows
that when the market gets stronger, firms are more likely to engage in external transactions
because the pool of internal buyers and sellers becomes much smaller relative to the external
market. Furthermore, our model shows that after controlling for market strength, internal
transactions tend to have a lower sale price. The intuition behind this result is that since an
internal transaction can capture the commissions from both parties, the agent has a stronger
incentive to expedite the transaction by lowering the sale price. To empirically test these
relations, we use a detailed set of Multiple Listing Service (MLS) records of single-family
transactions in Hampton Roads over the period 1993(Q1) to 2013(Q1), and find that our
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theoretical results are supported.
The key findings in our paper indicate two important results. First, a potential self-
correction mechanism for the principal-agent problem may exist within the housing market.
As the market strengthens, external buying orders become more attractive to agents leading
them to engage in more external transactions. Note that the principal-agent problem we
study here mainly arises from internal transactions. This problem will be reduced by mar-
ket strength because when the market strengthens, there are fewer internal transactions.
Second, our results show that selling prices in internal transactions are lower. So when the
market weakens, internal transactions increase. The increase in internal transactions further
reduces market price which drives sellers out and further reduces the strength of the market.
In this way, the strength of the housing market can reinforce itself through agents’ choosing
a specific transaction type (internal or external). Hence, the equilibrium brokerage choice
creates a self-reinforcing mechanism toward generating more extreme market conditions.
4.2 The Model
Our model is mainly inspired by Yinger (1981), Goetzmann and Peng (2006), Hagiu and
Jullien (2011), and Han and Hong (2016). In the model, following Goetzmann and Peng
(2006), we assume that the selling agents have full power in deciding whether to sell the
house (fully delegation).
The search and match process in the housing market is from Yinger (1981) and Hagiu
and Jullien (2011). The search process for buying orders is assumed to follow a Poisson
process at rate λi,ha (search rate), where the search rate is decided by firm i, the house itself
h and the order type a (a = in for internal orders and a = ex for external orders). This
assumption is consistent with the findings of Bond et al. (2007) in which UK data are
used to investigate a number of assumptions associated with the distribution of time on the





where Nex (a = ex for Na) is the total number of purchase offers that can be searched by
an agent in external lists, Nin (a = in for Na) is the total number of purchase offers that
can be searched by an agent in internal lists. ki,hin , k
i,h
ex are parameters which depend on
firm i and house h. More competent brokerage firms can search faster for buying orders,
and better houses can attract buying orders faster. We assume Nin < Nex, which means
that external transactions have larger searching pools (notice that even though we divide
the transactions into external and internal pools, in our model the agent will solicit offers
in the pooled market). We assume the arrival of internal and external buying orders is
independent, so the total process is a combined Poisson process.




in Nin + k
i,h
exNex
In addition, we assume ki,hin , k
i,h
ex are positive and increasing with firm i’s size. Because
when a brokerage firm is bigger, it can have more agents and more information for market
buying orders. Since ki,hin , k
i,h
ex are positive, a larger searching pool will lead to a higher
corresponding search rate λi,ha .
Denote tj as the waiting time between the arrival of the (j − 1)-th and the j-th buyer,





After waiting for Tn time, the selling agent has received n bids. The selling agent
can choose n to set the time he will wait in the market. Denote bid prices as P1, P2, ..., Pn.
Following Cheng, Lin, and Liu (2008), we assume recall is allowed, thus the highest available
bidder among the n offer prices is defined as
Pn = max{P1, P2, ..., Pn}




. The accepted sale
price is Xn, which is the price of the accepted buying order after receiving n offers. The
agents choose searching times n in the searching process. During the searching times, inter-
nal and external buying orders will arrive in the combined Poisson process. An agent will
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choose the buying order which gives him the highest commission. let ba be the commission
share for an agent who chooses order type a (recall that a can be either in for an internal
transaction or ex for an external transaction), and bin > bex. Her commission is baX
n.
Assuming the agent is risk neutral, the selling agent’s utility depends on his expected





where C(n) is the cost function associated with n searches for buying orders. Since the







where Tn is the time spent for n searches. The expected cost associated with n searches
















subject to Xn ≤ Pn
In this model, agents will choose the search times n. Then, during the n searches, if the
commission for the external buying order of the highest price is higher than the commission
for the internal buying orders of the highest price, agents will choose an external order; if the
commission for the external buying order of the highest price is lower than the commission
for the internal buying orders of the highest price, agents will choose an internal order; if the
commission for the external buying order of the highest price is the same as the commission
for the external buying order of the highest price, agents will randomize their choice. Figure
4.2 dipicts the tradeoff of the agent between internal and external transaction choices. Thus,
we can solve the model in two steps. First, assume n has been decided and use n to find
the optimal Xn. Then, substitute Xn into the original problem and find the optimal n.
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Figure 4.2: Tradeoff Between Internal and External Transactions










subject to Xn ≤ Pn




is a constant given n. Let pnin be the
probability of accepting an internal buying order after n searches, and let pnex be the prob-
ability of accepting an external buying order after n searches. Thus, in this model, we have
pnin+p
n
ex = 1. Denote X
n
in as the price of an accepted internal buying order, and denote X
n
ex
as the price of an accepted external buying order. In addition, let na be the number of type
a buying orders after n searches and denote Pna as the highest price among the searched
type a orders. That is to say, after n searches, there will be nex buying orders from external
pool, and the highest price among them is Pnex; there will be nin buying orders from internal
pool, and the highest price among them is Pnin. By definition, we have nin + nex = n. The









in + (1− pnin)bexXnex − E(C(n))
subject to Xnex ≤ Pnex, Xnin ≤ Pnin, 0 ≤ pnin ≤ 1
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in − bexPnex)− E(C(n))
subject to 0 ≤ pnin ≤ 1




ex, the agent will accept an external buying order,




ex, the agent will




ex, the agent will be
indifferent, and Xn will be either Pnin or P
n
ex. In addition, we assume bin/bex < P̄
/
P− , i.e.,
the commission share gap between an internal and an external transaction should be in a
reasonable range, otherwise agents will always choose the internal transaction, which is not
consistent with reality.


























































After solving for Xn, we can substitute it into the original problem and solve for n. In








ex|bexPnex ≥ binPnin)− E(C(n))
Since we have












































then we can rearrange equations (4.6) & (4.7) as




E(Pnex|bexPnex > binPnin) =
nΓP̄ + ρP−
nΓ + ρ














































which can be further simplified as










2 ) = cT (4.9)
Next, we start our comparative static analysis with this F.O.C equation.
From equation (4.9), denote Gfoc(λ
i,h













(n∗ Γρ + 1)
2 )− cT = 0
where n∗ is the optimal n that satisfies the F.O.C.
Taking the derivative of Gfoc(λ
i,h









































E(Pnin|bexPnex 6 binPnin) =
nΓP̄ + P−
nΓ + 1






















E(Pnex|bexPnex > binPnin) =
nΓP̄ + ρP−
nΓ + ρ



























exNex will increase and lead to an increase in the
expected sale price for both internal and external transactions. Also, as Nin increases,
λi,hin = k
i,h
in Nin will increase and lead to an increase in the expected sale price for both
internal and external transactions.
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is the expected transaction time.





































































exNex will go up, and the expected transaction
time will decrease. Also, as Nin increases, we have similar results.
As the housing market strengthens, there are more external and internal buying orders,
i.e. Nex, Nin increase. Since there are more new entries in a strong market, external buying
orders will increase at a higher rate than internal buying orders, thus NexNin also increases.
From previous results, we know that the expected sale prices for both internal and external
transactions will be higher and the expected transaction time will be shorter as the market
strengthens.
Figure 4.3: The Relation Between Market Strength and Transaction type
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bility of a transaction being internal will decrease, and the probability of a transaction being
external will increase.
This relationship is depicted in Figure 4.3.











































Thus, when the market strengthens, i.e., when Nex, Nin,
Nex
Nin
increase, the probability of
an agent choosing internal buying orders, pin, will decrease, and the probability of choosing
external buying orders, pex, will increase.
Proposition 4.2. When the search rate ratio between internal and external transactions
becomes larger, i.e., when λi,hin
/
λi,hex increases, the probability of a transaction being internal
increases.
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Then, taking the derivative of Gλfoc(
λi,hin
λi,hex

























































Proposition 4.3. The expected sale price of an internal transaction will be less than the
expected sale price of an external transaction.
Proof. Recall that from equations (4.6) & (4.7), we have





















































(nΓ + ρ) (nΓ + 1)
> 0
Therefore, the expected sale price of an internal transaction will be less than the expected
sale price of an external transaction.
Proposition 4.4. When the search rate ratio between internal and external buying orders
becomes larger, i.e., when λi,hin
/
λi,hex increases, the expected sale price for both internal and
external transactions will increase.
Proof. From equations (4.6) & (4.7), we have




E(Pnex|bexPnex > binPnin) =
nΓP̄ + ρP−
nΓ + ρ





















λi,hex increases, i.e., when the firm’s search rate ratio between internal
and external buying orders increases, the expected sale price for both internal and external
transactions will increase.
The above results are summarized in Table 4.1. In the Empirical Results section, we
will test these theoretical results (Proposition 4.1 to Proposition 4.4) with empirical data.

























Our housing transaction data are based upon the complete record of single-family trans-
actions in Hampton Roads over the period 1993(Q1)-2013(Q1), as provided by Real Estate
Information Network (REIN). Due to the strength of the data, which includes 375,800
detailed records of housing characteristics including physical structure and neighborhood
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Table 4.2: Definition of Variables: Key Variables
Key Variables Description
Internal Transaction Equals 1 if the buyer and seller agents work for the
same firm; 0 otherwise.
Dual Agent Equals 1 if the buyer and seller agent is the same per-
son; 0 otherwise.
Price Ratio The average ratio of sale price to original price dur-
ing the month immediately preceding the transaction
within the same zip code.
Trade Time The average transaction time during the month before
the transaction within the same zip code (in years).
Internal/external Ratio Ratio of the number of internal transactions to the
numbers of external transactions conducted by the
brokerage firm within a year of the closed date. This
variable serves as a proxy related to the ratio of arrival
rates for internal transactions to the rates of external
transactions.
Sale price Selling price of the property (value is in natural log:
Log(Sale Price)).
Original Price Original list price of the property (value is in natural
log form: Log(list Price)).
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Table 4.3: Definition of Variables: House Characteristics
House Characteristic Variable Description
#Bathrooms Number of Bathrooms
#Bedrooms Number of Bedrooms
#Fireplaces Number of Fireplaces
#Rooms Number of Rooms
Square Footage Size of the house (000s)
#Stories Number of Stories
Year Built Years since the home was built (in 10 years)
Tax Amount Taxes required per year ($ 000s)
#Floors Number of floors in the home
POAFEE Extra fees paid to the community to maintain the
common elements
Parking An index ranging from 1 to 4, with 4 being the most
desirable parking offered
WaterviewDummy Equals 1 if home has a water view; 0 otherwise.
CityviewDummy Equals 1 if home has a city view; 0 otherwise.
WoodsviewDummy Equals 1 if home has a woods view; 0 otherwise.
WaterDummy Equals 1 if home is connected to the city water sys-
tem; 0 otherwise.
AtticDummy Equals 1 if the home has an attic; 0 otherwise.
FeeSimpleDummy Equals 1 if the home is owned as fee simple; 0 other-
wise.
GasDummy Equals 1 if water heater is gas; 0 otherwise.
DetachedDummy Equals 1 if home is detached; 0 otherwise.
















































































































































































































































































information, we are able to obtain a more accurate estimate of models for internal transac-
tions, expected market price, and time on the market. One major difficulty when examining
the price impact due to the impact of brokerage is unobserved housing quality (Shui 2015).
To mitigate this problem, we first drop observations that have more than one sale within
a year to omit potential housing flippers that might cause changes in house quality. Based
on this screen, we jettisoned 60,823 data points, leaving 314,977 observations. Moreover,
we take a 99% winsorization of the key variables: sales prices, original list price, price ra-
tio, trade time and internal/external ratio. We then adopt a two-stage process similar to
Genesove and Mayer (2001). In stage 1, we first run a full sample hedonic regression with
all observable characteristics. We then focus only on repeat sales data and use the residual
from the prior transaction of the same unit as a proxy for the unobserved housing quality,
and conduct our main analysis in this stage. This treatment leaves 84,238 observations
in the second stage analysis. To correct the standard error bias caused by the generated
regressor, we use a two-stage bootstrap method for the estimations.
Table 4.2 defines the key variables examined in our model, while Table 4.3 introduces the
housing characteristic control variables used in our regression. Table 4.4 provides summary
statistics for our key variables. The Dual Agent variable describes whether the transaction
is conducted by the same person who works for both sides. From the summary result, we
can see that dual agent transactions accounts for 15.71% of all housing market transactions.
Similarly, the Internal Transaction variable describes whether the transaction is conducted
by the same firm. From the summary result, we can see that internal transactions accounts
for 23.58% of all transactions. The average sale price is 189,327, a little lower than the
original list price (196,265). Price Ratio describes the ratio of the sale price to the original
list price. The mean price ratio in the sample is 0.9690. We use this variable as a proxy
of market strength, where a higher ratio suggests a stronger market. Trade Time describes
transaction time of a house from listing to selling. The mean trade time in the sample is
0.1646 year (about 2 months). This variable serves as another proxy of market strength in
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our model, where a shorter trade time suggests a stronger market.
4.4 Empirical Results
Before examining the empirical questions, we present the results from the first stage
hedonic regression in Table A4.6.1 (See Appendix).
4.4.1 Impact of Market Strength on Brokerage Choice
To estimate the impact of market strength on brokerage choice, following Han and Hong
(2016), we use the following Logistic model:
P (dibt = 1|Zit, Xit,Wbt) =
exp(Zitγe +Xitγi +Wbtδ + ηibt)
exp(Zitγe +Xitγi +Wbtδ + ηibt) + 1
where dibt is an indicator variable for whether transaction i in period t is an internal transac-
tion carried out by brokerage b, and Zit is a vector of variables measuring market strength.
Specifically, Zit = (PriceRatioit, T radeT imeit), where the PriceRatio is the average ratio
of sale price to original list price during the month preceding transaction i within the same
zipcode, TradeT ime t is the average market transaction time during the month before
transaction i within the same county. Xit refers to a vector of home characteristic control
variables including lot size, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, a basement dummy,
etc. Wbt refers to brokerage level variables. Here, we use internal/external transaction ratio
as a proxy for Wbt. In more detail, the internal/external arrival ratio measures the ratio of
the number of internal transactions to the numbers of external transactions conducted by
the brokerage firm within a year of the transaction closing date. This variable serves as a
proxy related to the ratio of arrival rates for internal transactions to the rates of external
transactions. In addition, ηibt contains various fixed effects for the year and month of the
transaction, brokerage firm, region, and home characteristics. The estimation of this model
is displayed in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. In Table 4.5, internal transactions are reported, whereas
in Table 4.6, the more narrowly defined dual agent transaction results are shown.
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In comparison to the theoretical model, brokerage firms’ differences are represented by
their index i; houses’ differences are represented by index h; the average time on the market
corresponds to the average of E(Tn(i, h)); the average sale price on the market corresponds




Table 4.5 displays the estimation results for the likelihood of being engaged in an internal
transaction. Three different models are estimated. Column 1 is the baseline estimation
where market strength is measured using both the ratio of sale price to original list price (i.e.,
the price premium effect) and market transaction time (i.e., the liquidity premium effect).
The related coefficient for price ratio estimated in column 1 is statistically significant, and
the sign is consistent with expectations. The ratio of sale price to original list price has a
negative impact on the probability of a realized internal transaction. We can also see that
market transaction time has a positive impact on the probability of an internal transaction,
although the coefficient is not significant. When the market gets stronger, the ratio of sale
price to original list price increases, market transaction time decreases, and the probability
of an internal transaction decreases. This is consistent with Proposition 4.1 which claims
the probability of a transaction being internal will decrease with market strength. From
the estimation of the Logistic model, we can observe the average marginal effect of the
variables. For example, when other variables are evaluated at their average value, a 1
standard deviation increase in the ratio of sale price to original list price will produce a
1.0106% decrease in the probability of an internal transaction being realized. When other
variables are evaluated at their average value, a 1 standard deviation increase in market
time will produce a 0.2658% increase in the probability of a realized internal transaction.
Compared with the average proportion for an internal transaction (23.58%), this effect is not
negligible. Furthermore, note that the empirical estimation is for the realized probability
that the transaction is internal. Since the market shares for the new buying orders are
different among firms, the willingness to choose external transactions may not be fully
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Table 4.5: Impact of Market Strength on Brokerage Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal Transaction
Price Ratio -0.0775∗∗∗ -0.0845∗∗∗ -0.0845∗∗∗ -0.0488∗∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0140) (0.0164)
Trade Time 0.0193 0.0270 0.0270∗ 0.0045
(0.0202) (0.0199) (0.0161) (0.0187)
Internal/external Ratio 1.1341∗∗∗ 0.5113∗∗∗ 0.5113∗∗∗ 0.5264∗∗∗
(0.0929) (0.0602) (0.0628) (0.0642)
Stage 1 Residual -0.0425 -0.0445 -0.0445 -0.0803
(0.0858) (0.0847) (0.0756) (0.0769)
FEregion Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEyearmonth Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEbrokerageoffice No Yes Yes Yes
FEzipcode*month No No No Yes
House Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Price Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.6151∗∗∗ -0.8591 -0.8591∗ 13.6790
(0.2389) (0.5338) (0.4855) (0.9523)
Number of Observation 84,238 84,238 84,238 84,238
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level in parentheses for (1), (2). Robust
standard errors clustered at zip code level and brokerage office level in parentheses for (3), (4).
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
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Table 4.6: Impact of Market Strength on Dual Agent Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dual Agent
Price Ratio -0.0944∗∗∗ -0.1026∗∗∗ -0.1026∗∗∗ -0.0563∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0239) (0.0175) (0.0208)
Trade Time 0.0329 0.0356 0.0356∗ 0.0074
(0.0235) (0.0229) (0.0192) (0.0232)
Internal/external Ratio 0.8725∗∗∗ 0.5278∗∗∗ 0.5278∗∗∗ 0.5480∗∗∗
(0.0726) (0.0649) (0.0676) (0.0693)
Stage 1 Residual -0.1083 -0.0598 -0.0598 -0.0800
(0.1257) (0.1195) (0.1065) (0.1095)
FEregion Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEyearmonth Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEbrokerageoffice No Yes Yes Yes
FEzipcode*month No No No Yes
House Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Price Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2.2490∗∗∗ -1.0575∗ -1.0575∗∗ 15.1511
(0.3019) (0.6007) (0.5365) (0.7863)
Number of Observation 84,238 84,238 84,238 84,238
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level in parentheses for (1), (2). Robust
standard errors clustered at zip code level and brokerage office level in parentheses for (3), (4).
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
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realized in reality when the market strengthens. So market strength can have a greater
impact on the preference for internal transactions than the estimated result. Recall that,

















which means the impact of market strength on preference for an internal transaction will
be greater for firms with a higher probability of choosing internal transactions. Note that
the estimated result is for the average effect, so agents who previously had a higher proba-
bility of choosing an internal transaction will be more impacted by market strength. This
implies that the estimated effect is stronger for firms who are mainly engaged in internal
transactions. If a firm is primarily engaging in internal transactions, our results indicate
that market strength may have a huge impact on its preference for choosing the type of
transaction.
Concerning the control variables, the coefficient associated with the internal/external
transaction ratio in the office is positive and highly significant, which is also consistent with
Proposition 4.2 which claims the probability of a transaction being internal will increase
with the search rate ratio between internal and external transactions. Intuitively, when the
internal/external transaction ratio is larger, a firm’s search rate for internal buying orders is
higher. Thus, the incentive for internal transactions increases, which leads to more internal
transactions.
In the baseline estimation, we control for a wide range of attributes including home
characteristics, region, time, and so forth. To control for the potential effect of unobserved
brokerage office characteristics, we include brokerage office fixed effects in the baseline
model. The result in column 2 reveals that the key coefficient estimates on ratio of sale
price to original list price and internal/external transaction ratio continue to be significant
and have the expected sign. We can also see that the coefficient on market transaction
time remains positive, although the coefficient is not significant. This suggests that the
unobserved brokerage office effect is unlikely to change the interpretation of our findings.
129
To allow for intragroup autocorrelation within the area and the brokerage office, we
estimate a model with two-way clustering at both the zip code level and brokerage office
level. We can see in column 3 that the signs and significance levels of the price ratio and
internal/external transaction ratio remain the same, which indicates that our results are
robust to this change. In addition, the coefficient on market transaction time becomes sig-
nificant. The results presented here demonstrate a strong relation between market strength
and the probability of engaging in internal transactions.
To control for interacting effects of region and time, in column 4, we include the inter-
action term of zip code and the month of closing date. We can see that the key coefficient
estimates on ratio of sale price to original list price and internal/external transaction ratio
continue to be significant and have the expected sign. This finding lends further support to
the robustness of our result.
We next examine the relation between market strength and the probability of engaging
in dual agent transactions, a subset of internal transactions where the buyer and seller are
represented by the same agent. In Table 4.6, we see that the sign and significance level of
the coefficient estimates on ratio of sale price to original list price and market transaction
time remain qualitatively similar.
4.4.2 Impact of Internal Transactions on Sale Price
To estimate the impact of an internal transaction on sale price, we use the log-linear
hedonic model:
lnPibt = dibtθ1 + Zitα1 +Xitβ1 +Wbtδ1 + η1ibt
where Tibt is the market transaction time of transaction i carried out by brokerage b at
time t. As before, dibt is an indicator variable for whether transaction i at period t is
an internal transaction carried out by brokerage b. Zit is a vector of variables measur-
ing market strength: Zit = (PriceRatioit, T radeT imeit). Xit refers to a vector of home
characteristic control variables. Wbt refers to brokerage level variables. As before, we use
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internal/external transaction ratio as a proxy for Wbt. In addition, η1ibt contains various
fixed effects. The estimation results are displayed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Table 4.7 reflects
internal transactions, whereas Table 4.8 reports results for dual agent transactions.
Table 4.7 displays estimation results for sale price using three nested specifications. To
control for unobserved home quality which impacts sale price, we include the original list
price in all of the three estimations. In column 1, the baseline model, we see that an internal
transaction has a negative impact on sale price after controlling for market strength, among
other variables. Because the sale price is in log form, we follow Kennedy (1981) and interpret






Using this formula, we obtain g = −0.0059. That is, an internal transaction is associated
with a 0.59% sale price decrease after controlling for market strength. The reason for
this negative relation may be that firms can earn a higher share of the commission for
internal transactions, so they are willing to accept a lower sale price. This empirical result
is consistent with Proposition 4.3 which claims that the expected sale price of the internal
transactions will be less than the expected sale price of the external transactions. As for
the effect of market strength, we can see that the price ratio of sale price to original list
price is positively correlated with sale price. The coefficient on market transaction time is
positive and significant suggesting that although a longer market transaction time indicates
lower offers, agents may be willing to wait longer in a colder market, which increases the
number of offers received and hence increases the sale price. Moreover, the coefficient
on internal/external transaction ratio is positive and significant. Intuitively, when the
internal/external transaction ratio is greater, the firm will get a higher proportion of internal
buying orders during its search. Since internal transactions have greater commission share,
the higher probability of the presence of internal buying orders will encourage firms to
search more. Therefore, since there are more buying orders to choose from, the sale price
will be higher. This empirical result is consistent with Proposition 4.4 which posits that the
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Table 4.7: Impact of Internal Transactions on Sale Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Sale price)
Internal Transaction -0.0059∗∗ -0.0086∗∗∗ -0.0086∗∗∗ -0.0100∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Price Ratio 0.0165∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Trade Time 0.0077∗ 0.0079∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0014) (0.0012)
Internal/external Ratio 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Stage 1 Residual 0.1504∗∗∗ 0.1504∗∗∗ 0.1504∗∗∗ 0.1254∗∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0197) (0.0212) (0.0185)
FEregion Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEyearmonth Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEbrokerageoffice No Yes Yes Yes
FEzipcode*month No No No Yes
House Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Price Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11.4160∗∗∗ 11.3505∗∗∗ 11.3505∗∗∗ 11.1975∗∗∗
(0.0679) (0.0633) (0.0603) (0.0729)
R-Square 0.9136 0.9182 0.9182 0.9234
Number of Observation 84,238 84,238 84,238 84,238
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level in parentheses for (1), (2). Robust
standard errors clustered at zip code level and brokerage office level in parentheses for (3) and
(4).
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
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Table 4.8: Impact of Dual agent on Sale Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Sale price)
Dual Agent -0.0094∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0107∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0021)
Price Ratio 0.0164∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Trade Time 0.0077∗ 0.0079∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0014) (0.0012)
Internal/external Ratio 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Stage 1 Residual 0.1503∗∗∗ 0.1504∗∗∗ 0.1504∗∗∗ 0.1254∗∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0197) (0.0212) (0.0185)
FEregion Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEyearmonth Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEbrokerageoffice No Yes Yes Yes
FEzipcode*month No No No Yes
House Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Price Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11.4161∗∗∗ 11.3511∗∗∗ 11.3511∗∗∗ 11.1994∗∗∗
(0.0679) (0.0636) (0.0604) (0.0729)
R-Square 0.9136 0.9182 0.9182 0.9234
Number of Observation 84,238 84,238 84,238 84,238
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level in parentheses for (1), (2). Robust
standard errors clustered at zip code level and brokerage office level in parentheses for (3) and
(4).
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
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expected sale price will increase with the search rate ratio between internal and external
transactions after controlling for the type of transaction.
To control for the potential effect of unobserved brokerage office characteristics, we
include brokerage office fixed effects in the baseline model. The key result in column 2
remains similar to the baseline result. To allow for intragroup autocorrelation within the
area and brokerage office, we estimate in column 3, a model in which robust standard errors
are clustered at both the brokerage office level and zip code level. The significance levels of
the key coefficient estimates remain the same, which speaks to the robustness of the result.
As before, we next examine the relation between sale price and dual agent transactions.
As reported in Table 4.8, the sign and significance level of the coefficient estimates remain
similar. The only difference is that the coefficient on dual agent becomes more negative.
From Tables 4.7 and 4.8, we see that for internal transactions, sale prices will be lower.
This result shows the principal-agent incentive misalignment problem in the housing mar-
ket. Sellers want to sell the house at the highest price, while agents want to earn the highest
commissions at a given searching cost. Thus, for internal transactions, agents are willing to
accept lower prices offered by internal buying orders to receive higher commission, which
is not in the seller’s best interest. This incentive misalignment causes the principal-agent
problem within the housing market. From Tables 4.5 and 4.6, we see that as the market
strengthens, agents are more likely to engage in external buying orders, which helps reduce
the principal-agent incentive misalignment problem. This result indicates that the hous-
ing market has a self-correction mechanism for the principal-agent problem. As the mar-
ket strengthens, external buying orders become more attractive causing agents to engage
in more external transactions. Since the principal-agent incentive misalignment problem
we study here mainly comes from internal transactions, it is mitigated when the market
strengthens. From the above results, we have another important implication. Since selling
prices in internal transactions are lower, when the market weakens, internal transactions
increase and selling prices tend to be further reduced. A low price in the housing market
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can drive sellers out of the market, further weakening it. When the market strengthens,
the opposite situation tends to occur. In this sense, the strength of the housing market can
reinforce itself through transaction preference.
4.5 Conclusion
Many studies have been conducted to understand the impact that brokerage representa-
tion has on the home transaction process. We investigate brokerage choice not only between
external (where agents from different firms represent the buyer and the seller) versus internal
(where different agents from the same firm represent the buyer and the seller) transactions,
but also for a subset of internal transactions known as dual agent transactions, where a
single agent represents both the buyer and the seller in the same transaction.
We begin by building a theoretical model to establish a framework on which an empirical
model is based. Consistent with our theory, we find that as the housing market strengthens,
brokerage choice shifts to external transactions because the relative demand pool becomes
much greater potentially resulting in a higher selling price and shorter time on the market.
Moreover, after controlling for market strength, we find that internal transactions result in a
lower sale price. The intuition behind this result is that since agents in internal transactions
capture higher commissions from both parties, they have a stronger incentive to expedite
the transaction at the expense of lowering the sale price. This speaks to the principal-agent
problem in residential brokerage.
In sum, different from Johnson et al. (2015), which finds that dual agent brokerage
has no effect on sale price, our result suggests that internal transactions tend to lower sale
price (which harms the seller). But, when the market gets stronger, there are fewer in-
ternal transactions, and this agency problem is mitigated. As such, the housing market
has a self-correction mechanism for the principal-agent incentive misalignment problem. In
comparison with Han and Hong (2016), which finds that agents are more likely to promote
internal listings when they are financially rewarded and that this effect becomes weaker
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when consumers are more aware of agents’ incentives, our study provides another kind
of incentive misalignment between real estate agents and their clients, and the potential
self-correction mechanism in the market. This result is useful to real estate industry par-
ticipants in that sellers suffer from a suboptimal selling price. The good news is that as the
market strengthens, the principal-agent problem will be mitigated. However, the strength
of the housing market can be self-reinforcing. We find that internal transactions are asso-
ciated with lower transaction prices. So, when the market weakens, the ratio of internal
transactions in the market increases and prices decline, which can cause the market to fur-
ther weaken. Hence, the equilibrium brokerage choice creates a self-reinforcing mechanism
toward generating more extreme market conditions.
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4.6 Appendix: Hedonic Regression

























































Number of Observations 314,977
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
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